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CONSTITUTIONALLY TAILORING PUNISHMENT
Richard A. Bierschbach*
Stephanos Bibas**
Since the turn of the century, the Supreme Court has regulated noncapital
sentencing under the Sixth Amendment in the Apprendi line of cases (requiring jury findings of fact to justify sentence enhancements) as well as under the
Eighth Amendment in the Miller and Graham line of cases (forbidding
mandatory life imprisonment for juvenile defendants). Although both lines of
authority sound in individual rights, in fact they are fundamentally about the
structures of criminal justice. These two seemingly disparate doctrines respond
to structural imbalances in noncapital sentencing by promoting morally appropriate punishment judgments that are based on individualized input and
that reflect the perspectives of multiple institutional actors. This new understanding illuminates how both doctrines relate to the Court’s earlier regulation
of capital sentencing and how checks and balances can promote just punishment in a pluralistic system. It also underscores the need for other actors to
complete the Court’s work outside the confines of rights-based judicial doctrines by experimenting with a broader range of reforms that are not constitutionally required but rather are constitutionally inspired.
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Introduction
In the late twentieth century, the Supreme Court largely restricted constitutional sentencing law to capital cases, proclaiming that under the Eighth
Amendment, “death is different.”1 But, since the turn of the century, the
Court has revolutionized noncapital sentencing as well. The Apprendi v. New
Jersey line of cases interpreted the Sixth Amendment to define facts that
raise maximum punishments as substantive elements of crimes that require
jury findings.2 More recently, Graham v. Florida banned life without the
possibility of parole (“LWOP”) sentences for juveniles who have not killed.3
And, just last year, Miller v. Alabama forbade legislatively mandated LWOP
sentences for juveniles who have killed, although it permitted sentencers to
exercise discretion in imposing such sentences in unusual cases.4
These lines of cases appear to have little in common. Apprendi turned
on a highly formalistic interpretation of the Sixth Amendment right to
“trial[ ] by an impartial jury.”5 Graham and Miller were functionalist and
rested uneasily on the Eighth Amendment’s apparently substantive ban on
“cruel and unusual punishments.”6 If life imprisonment for juveniles were
itself substantively cruel, however, the Court should have banned it outright
1. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 435 (2008); Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S.
333, 342 (1993); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 357 (1977) (plurality opinion); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion). But cf. Williams v. New York,
337 U.S. 241, 245–52 (1949) (refusing to apply special procedural rules to death penalty cases
under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause).
2. 530 U.S. 466 (2000); see also United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005); Blakely v.
Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004); Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
3. 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2034 (2010).
4. 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469, 2471–72 & n.10, 2475 (2012) (consolidated opinion). Miller
was consolidated with Jackson v. Hobbs for argument and the Court’s decisions and opinions
for both appear together. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2455. References to Miller throughout this Article refer to both cases.
5. U.S. Const. amend. VI.
6. U.S. Const. amend. VIII.
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instead of simply leaving open a chance at parole or allowing sentencers to
impose LWOP on certain killers. Moreover, the decisions emphasized retribution and rehabilitation at the expense of deterrence and incapacitation,
even though the Eighth Amendment supposedly does not mandate any particular penological theory. Despite these oddities, most commentators persist in discussing Graham and Miller in terms of the substantive cruelty of
LWOP for juveniles, missing the procedural nuances.7
Perhaps for that reason, commentators have overlooked important parallels between the Graham and Apprendi lines. Both lines of cases marked a
departure from the Court’s usual deference to legislative judgment with respect to noncapital sentencing decisions. Both also limited judges’ powers in
some ways while enhancing them in others. And both read constitutional
provisions in unexpected ways to reallocate sentencing power among various
actors rather than to limit sentences or sentence enhancements directly and
substantively. Both lines of cases thus fit oddly within the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments’ jurisprudential boxes.
We see deep connections between these seemingly unrelated doctrines.
The Court is awkwardly squeezing fundamental notions about the structural
features of a system of just punishment into disparate individual rights provisions. What is emerging is a larger structural and procedural framework
for constitutionally tailoring punishment.
Not all the decisions underlying this development are new—the Court
began regulating capital procedures nearly four decades ago, and cases like
the analogous Woodson/Lockett/Eddings trilogy, which took a largely procedural approach to individualizing death sentences, have been with us since
the 1970s.8 Those cases, however, were confined by the “death is different”
mantra, while now a similar approach is starting to reshape noncapital sentencing. It is informed in significant part by notions of checks and balances
and the structural dimensions of due process. The unifying strand is the
Court’s tacit recognition that, in our constitutional democracy, one cannot
separate questions of substantively just punishment from those of procedural and institutional design. Checks and balances are essential not only to the
separation of powers in criminal justice but also to the promotion of morally appropriate punishments. This Article brings that idea to the surface,
appraises it, and explores possibilities for taking it seriously outside the confines of rights-based judicial doctrines.
7. See, e.g., Richard S. Frase, Graham’s Good News—and Not, 23 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 54
(2010); Craig S. Lerner, Juvenile Criminal Responsibility: Can Malice Supply the Want of Years?,
86 Tul. L. Rev. 309 (2011); Marsha Levick et al., The Eighth Amendment Evolves: Defining
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Through the Lens of Childhood and Adolescence, 15 U. Pa. J.L. &
Soc. Change 285 (2012); Alison Siegler & Barry Sullivan, “ ‘Death Is Different’ No Longer”:
Graham v. Florida and the Future of Eighth Amendment Challenges to Noncapital Sentences,
2010 Sup. Ct. Rev. 327.
8. See Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978)
(plurality opinion in part); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976) (plurality opinion); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (plurality opinion); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S.
238 (1972) (per curiam).
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Few scholars have focused on such a process-driven approach to understanding the Court’s recent constitutional sentencing law. Rachel Barkow,
for instance, has explored the importance of separated powers to the constitutional framework for sentencing. She advocates a formalist approach,
favoring strict protection of the jury’s role in applying sentencing laws and
the redesign of prosecutors’ offices to prevent undue concentrations of
power in prosecutorial hands.9 And, writing before Apprendi and Graham,
Lou Bilionis explained that many of the Court’s substantive constitutional
criminal law cases embrace a “process reinforcement” view of constitutional
regulation that seeks to interfere only to correct legislative breakdowns or to
protect politically disfavored groups.10 Bilionis endorses that approach as
giving pride of place to legislative primacy over criminal law choices, including the conscious choice, in an imperfect world, to impose on defendants
“the risk of morally unjustified or excessive sanctions.”11 In Apprendi and
Graham, we see the Court taking a third path. It is groping toward sentencing procedures that ensure particularized decisionmaking that reflects the
contributions of a range of actors, much as it did in its capital punishment
decisions of the 1970s and 1980s.
The Court’s approach rests on three interconnected principles. The first
is that, ideally, sentences should reflect morally appropriate judgments. They
should give significant weight to notions of retributive desert and a defendant’s potential for reform. Although the Court sometimes says that it is not
adopting any one theory of punishment, its framework rests on a core commitment to a democratic brand of retributivism, tempered by other punishment values. Second, morally appropriate judgments require at least some
measure of individualized input. While there is plenty of room for wholesale
legislation and policies ex ante, just sentencing also presupposes some finegrained determinations at the retail level of individual cases. Third, in determining what is morally appropriate and what is not, no one actor should
hold all the cards. Power should be diffused among multiple actors. Overlapping powers and checks should act as a series of vetogates to ensure that
punishments reflect both individual desert and the conscience of the community, rather than a single institution’s idiosyncratic or momentary harshness. Checks and balances thus help to legitimize sentences and to give
content to the notion of moral appropriateness.
These principles are not always consciously expressed or consistently
followed in the Court’s sentencing decisions, but they are latent in many of
them. They undergirded Woodson/Lockett/Eddings and the Court’s capital
9. Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 989,
1041–44 (2006) [hereinafter Barkow, Separation of Powers]; see also Rachel E. Barkow, Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law, 61 Stan. L. Rev.
869, 873–74 (2009) [hereinafter Barkow, Institutional Design]; Rachel E. Barkow, Recharging
the Jury: The Criminal Jury’s Constitutional Role in an Era of Mandatory Sentencing, 152 U. Pa.
L. Rev. 33, 106–12 (2003) [hereinafter Barkow, Recharging the Jury].
10. Louis D. Bilionis, Process, the Constitution, and Substantive Criminal Law, 96 Mich.
L. Rev. 1269, 1318–32 (1998).
11. Id. at 1307.

December 2013]

Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment

401

punishment jurisprudence in general, and we see them at the core of the
Graham and Apprendi lines. Viewing these capital and noncapital cases together illuminates how structural and process-focused considerations can
help sentencing to accommodate competing punishment principles. That
perspective reunites substantive criminal law with its estranged spouse,
criminal procedure. It also helps to move past some of the otherwise-puzzling doctrinal issues and limitations that inhere in an overtly rights-based
approach. And it lays the groundwork for translating the Court’s concerns
into concrete reforms that could better serve the values embodied in the
Court’s decisions.
Before continuing, we should say a word about our methodology. Our
project weaves together interpretive analysis, normative appraisal, and policy
prescriptions. By reading these disparate lines of cases together, we expose
the latent constitutional values that we believe that they share.12 Those values, we further maintain, are normatively desirable. But the Court is constrained from fully realizing them by the doctrinal boxes into which its
decisions must fit. Prescriptively, then, we advocate taking those values as a
touchstone for developing reforms not only in the courts but also—and
primarily—among other criminal justice actors and institutions. The Court
must act incrementally, case by case, and through the doctrinal lens of individual rights. Nonjudicial actors, however, can follow the Court’s lead, experiment with reforms, and flesh out the Court’s overarching project in
ways not required by the letter of its decisions.
Part I of this Article explores the decisions’ doctrinal contours and the
constitutional values and concerns that we see as lying at their core. The
Graham and Apprendi lines of cases respond to a series of structural
problems built into modern criminal justice. The decisions embody basic
constitutional principles about who should impose punishment and how.
But they operationalize those principles poorly, in part because they squeeze
them into Sixth and Eighth Amendment doctrinal boxes about individual
rights that do not easily fit the underlying structural problems.
Part II more directly examines a structural and procedural approach to
sentencing. It begins by explaining the importance of that approach to the
constitutional regulation of punishment. It then defends a structural approach that draws in a variety of institutions, each with its own strengths
and weaknesses, to give content to punishment norms. Sentencing is a democratic rather than a philosophically pure exercise, centered on shared retributive intuitions but tempered by equality, crime control, mercy, and a
host of other concerns. This complex understanding of justice requires
blending the views of a range of actors, some of whom are good at specifying ex ante rules and some of whom are better at weighing the equities ex
12. Importantly, we do not purport to offer an intentionalist or motivational account
of the cases. We do not, in other words, claim that the cases consciously and consistently mean
to advance the vision of criminal justice that we put forth. Our interpretive claim is more
modest: that, whatever the intentions or motivations behind the cases and the views of the
individual justices themselves, the decisions at their cores cohere around the shared set of
values that we describe.
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post within the framework set by the rules. Courts’ constitutional rulings
can prompt this sort of give-and-take, but they cannot fine-tune the structures of criminal justice on their own.
In that vein, Part III moves beyond our interpretive and normative accounts to prescribe concrete ways to better advance structural reforms in
practice. It offers suggestions on how to divide sentencing power; explanations of how baseline rules and presumptions could encourage more
nuanced uses of mandatory minima, sentencing guidelines, and plea bargaining; procedures for reassessing initial charging and sentencing decisions
and more effectively structuring back-end safety valves; and ways to prompt
prosecutors’ more measured pursuit of the toughest charges and punishments. For the most part, our suggestions are constitutionally inspired, not
constitutionally required; we embrace nonconstitutional policy reforms with
an eye toward the constitutional values discussed in Parts I and II. The point
is that policymakers and other actors can move beyond the Court’s individual rights framework to effectuate reforms that better address the underlying
structural concerns.
I. Structural Problems, Individual Rights
The landscape of modern criminal justice looks very different from that
of two centuries ago when trials were the norm, criminal codes were vastly
smaller, and local citizens provided a real check on prosecutorial and legislative power.13 For the most part, however, the Court has all but ignored how
that landscape has shaped criminal sentencing, limiting its constitutional
sentencing law over the past four decades mostly to capital punishment. The
Court put blinders on its sentencing case law, insisting that death is different
instead of seeing how its concerns might apply more broadly.14
Graham and Apprendi were the Court’s first real responses to the structural imbalances that characterize modern noncapital sentencing practices,
and they came in the form of disparate Sixth and Eighth Amendment holdings about individual rights. Section I.A lays out the chief features of sentencing’s imbalance. Section I.B offers a fresh interpretive account of the
Graham and Apprendi lines to highlight the principles they have in common.
The decisions rest on a commitment to morally appropriate, individualized
punishment that has a retributive core but that also acknowledges a wide
range of other competing punishment considerations. And they accommodate that mix of considerations through procedural checks and balances that
draw multiple institutions and actors into sentencing determinations. The
Court has most fully articulated those principles in capital sentencing, and
they stand in tension with the modern realities described in Section I.A. As
Section I.C explains, however, Graham and Apprendi operationalize those
13. See, e.g., William J. Stuntz, The Collapse of American Criminal Justice
72–73, 83–84 (2011).
14. Rachel E. Barkow, The Court of Life and Death: The Two Tracks of Constitutional
Sentencing Law and the Case for Uniformity, 107 Mich. L. Rev. 1145, 1196 (2009).
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principles haphazardly. By hewing closely to their narrow, rights-based doctrinal frameworks, they obscure the structural and procedural considerations at stake.
A. Structural Problems
The structural imbalances of modern criminal justice will be familiar to
some readers. Foremost on the list is prosecutors’ domination of the process.
Prosecutors control sentencing largely through plea bargaining, which disposes of more than 95 percent of criminal cases.15 Throughout the bargaining process, prosecutors exercise virtually unreviewable discretion in
deciding which charges to file, which deals to strike, and which sentences to
recommend.16 This discretion gives them enormous leverage to threaten
heavier charges and penalties in order to induce guilty pleas. Like everyone
else, prosecutors have their own incentives and ambitions. They tend to use
their leverage to move cases through the system quickly and to maximize
convictions, thus promoting deterrence and incapacitation.17 Sentencing and
appellate judges mostly rubber-stamp these deals for a variety of reasons:
they have busy dockets, they lack information, and defendants rarely complain or appeal because they prefer to avoid heavier post-trial sentences.18
Moreover, legislatures enable prosecutors, further skewing the balance
of power. Prosecutors’ leverage, after all, is only as great as the charges and
punishments they can threaten. Today’s criminal codes offer prosecutors an
almost limitless range of crimes and likely penalties from which to choose
when prosecuting a given bad act. Both popular politics and interest-group
pressures mean that legislators benefit politically from taking tough-oncrime stances and from ensuring that prosecutors have the tools they need to
do their jobs.19 Legislators also necessarily define crimes prospectively and
generally, with little knowledge of how courts will construe them or what
mix of cases prosecutors will bring under them.20 They thus have incentives

15. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 9, at 1049; see 2012 Sourcebook of Federal
Sentencing Statistics fig.C, U.S. Sent’g Commission, http://www.ussc.gov/Data_and_Statistics/
Annual_Reports_and_Sourcebooks/2012/FigureC.pdf (last visited May 13, 2013) (indicating
that federal guilty plea rates for the years 2008–2012 ranged between 96 and 97 percent).
16. See, e.g., Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 Fordham L. Rev. 2117, 2125 (1998); Ronald F. Wright & Marc L. Miller, The Worldwide Accountability Deficit for Prosecutors, 67 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1587, 1596–600 (2010).
17. See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Legal Guilt, Normative Innocence, and the Equitable Decision
Not to Prosecute, 110 Colum. L. Rev. 1655, 1707–08 (2010); Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in
the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 Calif. L. Rev. 1471, 1498–500 (1993).
18. See, e.g., George Fisher, Plea Bargaining’s Triumph 91, 123–27 (2003).
19. See Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715, 729–30 (2005)
[hereinafter Barkow, Administering Crime]; Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 9, at
1030; William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 505,
552–57 (2001).
20.

Stuntz, supra note 19, at 547.
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to create broad and deep codes, delegating enforcement details to prosecutors.21 Prosecutors, in turn, exploit this dynamic to further their own interests, lobbying legislators for even broader power and still more discretion.22
In many cases, prosecutors have incentives to advocate for a tougher statutory sentence than even they believe is appropriate for a given crime just to
increase their bargaining power, and legislators often have incentives to give
it to them.23
This cycle has been accompanied by (and has contributed to) escalating
penalties across the board. Mandatory minimum sentences are now common for many crimes, hemming in judges’ discretion.24 The truth-in-sentencing movement has abolished discretionary parole in many jurisdictions
and has vastly curtailed it in a number of others.25 Guidelines regimes have
added yet another level of rigidity to sentencing. And convictions for even
the most low-level crimes now often trigger a litany of collateral consequences, some of which can be worse than the punishment itself.26 For the
most part, these developments have benefitted prosecutors, increasing their
plea-bargaining leverage.
The dominance of plea bargaining, the shift in power to prosecutors,
and the increase in punitiveness have squeezed other voices, perspectives,
and considerations out of the criminal justice system. Plea bargaining occurs
early and out of sight, bypassing juries and excluding the views and evidence
of other local community members, victims, and defendants that would
normally emerge at trial.27 Where juries and judges were once able to make
context-sensitive determinations about an offender’s blame and need for
punishment, they no longer can. Judges still formally sentence defendants,
21. See id. at 547–49; see also Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal)
Criminal Law, 1 Buff. Crim. L. Rev. 23, 27–28 (1997).
22. The story of the Feeney Amendment to the PROTECT Act, in which the Department of Justice successfully lobbied for restrictions on and prosecutorial approval of downward departures under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, is just one of many illustrations. See
Daniel Richman, Political Control of Federal Prosecutions: Looking Back and Looking Forward,
58 Duke L.J. 2087, 2098–99 (2009); see also Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 19, at
728 & n.25 (providing additional examples).
23. Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 19, at 728; Stuntz, supra note 19, at 537;
see also Stephanos Bibas, The Machinery of Criminal Justice 47 (2012).
24. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 18, at 210–19; Beale, supra note 21, at 27–28; Paul H.
Robinson & Barbara A. Spellman, Sentencing Decisions: Matching the Decisionmaker to the
Decision Nature, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1124, 1152 (2005); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Rethinking
Mandatory Minimums, 28 Wake Forest L. Rev. 199, 200–14 (1993).
25. Jeremy Travis & Sarah Lawrence, Urban Inst. Justice Policy Ctr., Beyond
the Prison Gates: The State of Parole in America 4–7 (2002), available at http://www
.urban.org/UploadedPDF/310583_Beyond_prison_gates.pdf; see also Richard A. Bierschbach,
Proportionality and Parole, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1745, 1750–51 (2012) (discussing the dramatic
decline in discretionary parole during recent decades).
26. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010) (dealing with deportation as a
collateral consequence of a criminal conviction).
27. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Stephanos Bibas, Notice-and-Comment Sentencing, 97
Minn. L. Rev. 1, 13–16 (2012).
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but judges who do not preside over trials have little evidence to inform their
sentencing discretion, and their hands are often tied anyway by a combination of mandatory minima, guidelines, and prosecutors’ charging decisions.28 The curtailment of parole has also eliminated discretion on the back
end.29 It has taken the parole board’s views off the table and rendered evidence of eventual remorse, apology, rehabilitation, and the like largely irrelevant to an offender’s sentence. Where parole still exists, it overwhelmingly
focuses on risk management, and parole boards tend to consist of risk-averse
political appointees with no incentives to give offenders a second chance.30
Even executive clemency, for decades a real safety valve for correcting injustices and dispensing mercy, has all but disappeared.31
B. Constitutional Design
1. Moral Appropriateness, Individualization, Checks and Balances
Graham and Apprendi rest on a cluster of constitutional principles that
stands in tension with this modern picture. The Court has articulated those
principles in various ways over the years, expressing them most fully—if still
imperfectly—in its capital sentencing decisions. The first is that sentencing
is about ensuring morally appropriate judgments, not just case processing.
Moral appropriateness is, at its core, retributive. The Eighth Amendment
capital punishment cases from which Graham evolved—cases like Roper v.
Simmons,32 Atkins v. Virginia,33 and others decades before them34 —speak the
28. See id. at 10–11.
29. Between 1976 and 1999, the fraction of parole releases that were discretionary fell
from 65 percent to 24 percent; in other words, more than three-quarters of parole releases are
now automatic by operation of law. Travis & Lawrence, supra note 25, at 4–5.
30. See W. David Ball, Normative Elements of Parole Risk, 22 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 395,
397–98 (2011); Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1781–82; Alexandra Marks, For Prisoners, It’s a
Nearly No-Parole World, Christian Sci. Monitor, July 10, 2001, at 1, available at http://www
.csmonitor.com/2001/0710/p1s4.html; see also Michael M. O’Hear, Beyond Rehabilitation: A
New Theory of Indeterminate Sentencing, 48 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1247, 1248 (2011) (noting a
“precipitous decline” in the availability of parole in the last three decades of the twentieth
century).
31. See Daniel T. Kobil, Should Mercy Have a Place in Clemency Decisions?, in Forgiveness, Mercy, and Clemency 36, 37 (Austin Sarat & Nasser Hussain eds., 2007) (citing a
survey of commutations from 1995 to 2003 that found that “most states averaged fewer than
one hundred commutations . . . with thirty-four states . . . having dispensed twenty or fewer”);
Presidential Clemency Actions by Administration: 1945 to Present, U.S. Dep’t Just., http://www.
justice.gov/pardon/actions_administration.htm (last updated Apr. 4, 2011) (documenting
steady decrease in presidential grants of clemency petitions from 36 percent under President
Nixon to 1.8 percent under President George W. Bush).
32. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
33. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
34. See, e.g., Tison v. Arizona, 481 U.S. 137, 149 (1987); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 801 (1982); Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304–05 (1976) (plurality opinion).
See generally Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Sober Second Thoughts: Reflections on Two
Decades of Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 355, 364–66,
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general language of retributive desert. As Justice White wrote in Enmund v.
Florida, when imposing the death penalty, an offender’s “punishment must
be tailored to his personal responsibility and moral guilt.”35 It must, in other
words, “measurably contribute to the retributive end of ensuring that the
criminal gets his just deserts.”36 In part for that reason, the Court’s substantive proportionality cases make retributive principles—comparing the culpability of offenders and the severity of their punishments with those of
other offenders—a critical part of their analysis.37 (By contrast, until Graham, the Court’s Eighth Amendment cases had largely abjured tying noncapital sentencing to retributive desert.)38
At the same time, the Court’s retributivism is neither pure nor static. It
is popular, not philosophical. The Court looks to evidence of community
consensus to help give content to punishment norms, giving great weight to
state legislative judgments, on-the-ground sentencing practices, and other
indicia of popular views of moral appropriateness.39 In applying its own independent judgment to assess proportionality, the Court also weighs punishments against a spectrum of nonretributive ends, such as deterrence,
incapacitation, and especially rehabilitation and reformation.40 And when it
comes to tailoring capital sentencing determinations to ensure just punishment, the Court does not limit the sentencing inquiry to retributive considerations. Instead, it requires sentencers to consider a nearly unlimited range

372–78 (1995) (discussing the Court’s goal of ensuring deserved punishment in capital sentencing and its doctrinal efforts to implement it).
35. Enmund, 458 U.S. at 801.
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 568–72; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 317–21; see also Youngjae
Lee, The Constitutional Right Against Excessive Punishment, 91 Va. L. Rev. 677, 721–30 (2005)
(discussing the role of desert in the Supreme Court’s substantive proportionality cases).
38. See, e.g., Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 30–31 (2003) (plurality opinion) (holding
that a sentence of twenty-five years to life for the theft of three golf clubs was “not grossly
disproportionate and therefore [did] not violate the Eighth Amendment[ ]” (emphasis added)); Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (rejecting a requirement of individualized sentencing in noncapital cases and holding that a sentence of LWOP for a first-time felon
convicted of possessing 672 grams of cocaine was not disproportionate under the Eighth
Amendment).
39. See, e.g., Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2023–26 (2010); Roper, 543 U.S. at
564–67; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 314–17; Woodson, 428 U.S. at 295–96 (plurality opinion).
40. See, e.g., Ewing, 538 U.S. at 30; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 319–20; Gregg v. Georgia, 428
U.S. 153, 184–86 (1976) (plurality opinion); see also Youngjae Lee, The Purposes of Punishment
Test, 23 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 58, 58–59 (2010) (discussing the “purposes of punishment test” and
stating that the Court has resisted commitment to a specific theory of punishment); Carol S.
Steiker, Commentary, Panetti v. Quarterman: Is There a “Rational Understanding” of the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence?, 5 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 285, 290 (2007) (“In
the [Eighth Amendment] morass . . . one theme has remained consistent: the Court insists that
the Constitution is agnostic when it comes to penological purposes.”).
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of factors—forward- and backward-looking, retributivist and consequentialist—as potential mitigating circumstances.41 In the Court’s eyes, moral appropriateness is a fluid concept that contemplates an eclectic range of
inputs.42 Retributivism still focuses on common-sense intuitions and judgments about culpability, harm, and blame, but it is tempered by a wide
variety of other considerations.43 Desert as a sentencing principle is as much
a social and practical construct as it is a philosophical one, at least as a
matter of positive constitutional law.44
Desert also requires an individualized, granular inquiry. Legislative delegations and nose counting are relevant only to a point. Legislative judgments
can establish moral appropriateness at the broadest, wholesale level. And,
within bounds, rules can promote equal treatment and political accountability. But rules are by their nature overinclusive; they cannot capture every
nuance or factor that might take an offender outside the heartland of a given
sentencing statute.45 The Court has thus recognized the inherent limits of
legislatures’ ability to make final and categorical sentencing judgments ex
ante.46 Mandatory death sentences have been unconstitutional since the
41. See, e.g., McKoy v. North Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 436–37 (1990); Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989) (plurality opinion), abrogated by Atkins, 536 U.S. at 321; Mills v.
Maryland, 486 U.S. 367, 370 (1988); Sumner v. Shuman, 483 U.S. 66, 82 (1987); Hitchcock v.
Dugger, 481 U.S. 393, 397 (1987); Skipper v. South Carolina, 476 U.S. 1, 6–7, 14 (1986);
Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 115–16 (1982); Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 605 (1978)
(plurality opinion).
42. See Louis D. Bilionis, Moral Appropriateness, Capital Punishment, and the Lockett
Doctrine, 82 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 283, 301–02 (1991) (observing that Lockett’s individualization requirement “contains no reference to any particular moral theory or theories” and
instead embraces a principle of “moral neutrality”); Stephen P. Garvey, “As the Gentle Rain
from Heaven”: Mercy in Capital Sentencing, 81 Cornell L. Rev. 989, 1011 (1996) (discussing
the “laissez-faire character” of the capital sentencing mitigation inquiry); Carol S. Steiker &
Jordan M. Steiker, Let God Sort Them Out? Refining the Individualization Requirement in Capital Sentencing, 102 Yale L.J. 835, 853 (1992) (reviewing Beverly Lowry, Crossed Over: A
Murder, a Memoir (1992)) (noting that “there is no substantive limitation at all on a defendant’s ability to present” or the sentencer’s discretion to consider mitigating factors when
making an individualized determination of whether to impose a death sentence).
43. See, e.g., Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2026–28; Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 801
(1982).
44. Cf. Youngjae Lee, Desert, Deontology, and Vengeance, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 1141, 1142
(2011) (largely endorsing “[Paul] Robinson’s view that the criminal law’s desert judgments
should . . . closely resemble ordinary intuitions of desert”).
45. See Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law 177–99 (2004);
Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557, 588–93 (1992).
See generally Frederick Schauer, Playing by the Rules: A Philosophical Examination
of Rule-Based Decision-Making in Law and in Life (1991).
46. McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 204 (1971) (“To identify before the fact those
characteristics of criminal homicides and their perpetrators which call for the death penalty,
and to express these characteristics in language which can be fairly understood and applied by
the sentencing authority, appear to be tasks which are beyond present human ability.”), vacated, 408 U.S. 941 (1972); Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 247 (1949); Bilionis, supra
note 42, at 290 (“[A]ll mandatory schemes by their nature circumscribe the range of moral
considerations that are taken into account in an individual case to those which happen to be
reflected in the substantive criminal law’s doctrinal provisions.”).
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Court decided Woodson v. North Carolina in 1976.47 In their place, the Court
insisted on individualization. The Woodson/Lockett/Eddings trilogy emphasized that sentencers could ensure “a just and appropriate sentence” only by
“consider[ing] . . . the character and record of the individual offender and
the circumstances of the particular offense.”48 Statutory restrictions on allowable mitigating factors unduly restricted that task, frustrating the finegrained, particularized inquiry that was a “constitutionally indispensable
part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death.”49 (As with moral appropriateness, the Court, until Miller, limited its Eighth Amendment individualization requirement to capital cases.)50
Finally, just sentencing contemplates a diffusion of power among multiple institutional actors within a liberal democracy. Modern capital sentencing schemes reflect this insight. Legislatures make initial, broad sentencing
judgments ex ante by laying out the criteria for death-eligible crimes.51 The
Court has barred all death sentences for certain categories of defendants
(such as juveniles and insane and mentally retarded defendants) and crimes
(such as rape).52 Prosecutors then make first-cut, individualized, ex post sentencing judgments by deciding whether to file capital charges. Juries further
individualize, assessing every capital case not once but twice: first at the guilt
phase, when they decide whether the evidence supports conviction for a
death-eligible crime, and again at the sentencing phase, when they decide
whether death is the appropriate punishment.53 Judges also independently
review death sentences at a variety of stages: at charging, when they can
question the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a capital charge; immediately after trial, when they typically review jury verdicts for the death penalty to ensure that they are appropriate; and again on direct and collateral
47. 428 U.S. 280, 301, 305 (1976) (plurality opinion).
48. Woodson, 428 U.S. at 304.
49. Id.
50. See Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 20–24 (2003) (plurality opinion); Harmelin v.
Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 995–96 (1991).
51. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 206–07 (1976) (plurality opinion) (requiring
statutorily defined aggravating circumstances before capital punishment may be constitutionally imposed); Douglas Berman, Encouraging (and Even Requiring) Prosecutors to Be SecondLook Sentencers, 19 Temp. Pol. & Civ. Rts. L. Rev. 429, 431 (2010) (“[Legislators] must specify with some precision what particular aggravating circumstances make a particular crime
‘death-worthy.’ ”); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 373–89 (discussing how capital sentencing statutes attempt to channel sentencer discretion and narrow the class of death-eligible
offenders).
52. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005) (forbidding the death penalty
for crimes committed while under the age of eighteen); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 321
(2002) (forbidding execution of mentally retarded defendants); Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S.
399, 409–10 (1986) (forbidding execution of insane defendants); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S.
584, 597–600 (1977) (plurality opinion) (forbidding the death penalty for the crime of raping
an adult woman).
53. Berman, supra note 51, at 432; see also Alyssa Connell Lareau & Grant Henrichsen
Willis, Thirty-First Annual Review of Criminal Procedure: Capital Punishment, 90 Geo. L.J.
1838, 1845–47 (2002).
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appeal, the former of which is automatic in capital cases.54 Even governors
pay close attention to clemency issues in capital cases, as the executive-imposed moratoria in Illinois and Oregon show.55
Although the Court has not formally required the vast bulk of these
procedures as an Eighth Amendment matter, it has viewed most of them as
critical to the constitutionality of capital sentencing.56 The Court’s constitutional regulation of the death penalty has thus resulted in a system in which
capital sentencing determinations are filtered through multiple viewpoints
that act as vetogates, giving each actor a chance to influence the process and
kick the defendant out of the pipeline. The Court has emphasized that this
procedural system, in which different institutional actors have input at various points on punishment determinations, enhances the reliability and legitimacy of capital sentencing.57 Checks and balances, in short, advance the
individualized, morally appropriate determinations at which sentencing
aims. Capital sentencing seeks to promote substantively just punishments
largely by regulating procedures and structures.
One additional aspect of substantive justice is equality, which likewise
implicates a range of institutions and actors. Concerns about equality and
arbitrariness in the administration of the death penalty were critical to the

54. See Gregg, 428 U.S. at 204–07 (1976) (discussing Georgia’s statutory requirement
for a trial court to review a jury’s verdict for the death penalty against the facts of the case
before affirming the penalty’s imposition, as well as the Georgia Supreme Court’s “sentencereview function”); see also Va. Code Ann. § 19.2-264.5 (2008) (“When the punishment of any
person has been fixed at death, the court shall, before imposing sentence, direct a probation
officer of the court to thoroughly investigate the history of the defendant and any and all other
relevant facts, to the end that the court may be fully advised as to whether the sentence of
death is appropriate and just.”); Berman, supra note 51, at 431.
55. See Joseph L. Hoffmann & Nancy J. King, Improving Criminal Justice: How Can We
Make the American Criminal Justice System More Just?, 95 Judicature 59, 59 (2011) (“In Illinois . . . shocking revelations about innocent men on death row led first to a moratorium on
executions, and eventually to the abolition of capital punishment altogether.”); Jonathan J.
Cooper, Ore. Governor Bans Death Penalty for Rest of Term, Wash. Times (Nov. 23, 2011),
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2011/nov/23/ore-governor-bans-death-penalty-restterm (reporting on Oregon governor John Kitzhaber’s decision to issue a reprieve to any prisoner facing execution).
56. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 198 (emphasizing the importance of a state’s automatic
appellate review of death sentences in determining whether the state’s death penalty statute is
constitutional); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 371–96 (reviewing the constitutional
framework for regulation of capital punishment).
57. See Clemons v. Mississippi, 494 U.S. 738, 749 (1990) (“[T]his Court has repeatedly
emphasized that meaningful appellate review of death sentences promotes reliability and consistency.”); Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 362 (1977) (plurality opinion) (“[S]ince the
judge found, in disagreement with the jury, that the evidence did not establish any mitigating
circumstance, and since the presentence report was the only item considered by the judge but
not by the jury, the full review of the factual basis for the judge’s rejection of the advisory
verdict is plainly required.”); Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206 (“The provision for appellate review in the
Georgia capital-sentencing system serves as a check against the random or arbitrary imposition of the death penalty.”).
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Court’s constitutional regulation of capital sentencing.58 Those concerns
have received less overt attention (so far) in the Court’s constitutional turn
to noncapital sentencing. But they are still part of the story. At sentencing,
the justice system struggles to pursue two competing strands of equality at
the same time: treating like cases alike while treating unlike cases unalike.
The former implicates the wholesale, ex ante generalizations that are often
the province of legislatures and sentencing commissions, while the latter requires retail judgments ex post by courts and prosecutors. The former emphasizes rule-of-law values such as predictability, stability, transparency, and
accountability to voters; the latter focuses on individualized judgment calls
that are hard to codify or even anticipate. In recent decades, many jurisdictions have emphasized uniformity at the expense of individualization, for
example by enacting mandatory minimum sentences and binding sentencing guidelines (especially the federal guidelines). The tension between uniformity and individualization raises the fundamental question of what blend
of actors should have the final say at sentencing. Graham and Apprendi, the
next Section explains, do the same.
2. Graham, Apprendi, and Sentencing Design
The interplay of checks and balances, individualization, and morally appropriate punishments described above is latent in both the Graham and
Apprendi lines.
a. Graham
Like the Eighth Amendment cases that preceded them, Graham and
Miller took moral appropriateness as their baseline when evaluating the constitutionality of LWOP for juvenile offenders. Justice Kennedy in Graham
and Justice Kagan in Miller stressed juveniles’ immaturity, impressionability,
and plasticity as reasons why juveniles cannot categorically be said to deserve
LWOP, even for homicides.59 The conception of desert at work in their opinions is again eclectic and elastic. Many of the factors emphasized by the
Graham and Miller majorities—capacity for change, potential for rehabilitation, possibility of outgrowing one’s worst act—are difficult to square with a
purely retributive approach to desert.60 The same is true of many of the
mitigating circumstances that sentencers must hear under Woodson/Lockett/
Eddings.61 Indeed, without some substantive criteria requiring release, it is

58. See, e.g., Gregg, 428 U.S. at 193–95; Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 253–57
(1972) (Douglas, J., concurring); id. at 275, 277, 295 (Brennan, J., concurring); id. at 310
(Stewart, J., concurring); see also Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 378–89.
59. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2467–68 (2012); see also Graham v. Florida, 130
S. Ct. 2011, 2029 (2010).
60. See Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1782–85.
61. See supra notes 40–44 and accompanying text.
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far from clear how parole itself would fit into a retributive approach to punishment.62 The Court nevertheless viewed the possibility of parole as critical,
which shows that it did not care whether its vision was philosophically tidy.
Its point instead was that mandating (in Miller) or allowing (in Graham)
LWOP undermined moral appropriateness by making juveniles’ unique circumstances irrelevant to sentencing.63
The Court’s remedy was to require some opportunity to individualize
and take those personal circumstances into account. For juveniles who committed homicide, Miller required individualization at the initial sentencing
by striking down mandatory LWOP and requiring front-end sentencers to
weigh the appropriateness of LWOP case by case instead (while pointedly
noting that its imposition would likely be rare).64 For juveniles who did not
commit homicide, Graham required a second chance at individualization
later in the form of a parole hearing.65 And while Graham framed its rule as
a substantive limit on punishment, Miller later explicitly linked its holding to
individualization.66 Invoking Woodson/Lockett/Eddings, Justice Kagan wrote
that “mandatory penalties . . . preclude a sentencer from taking account of
an offender’s age and the wealth of characteristics and circumstances attendant to it” and that “a sentencer needed to examine all these circumstances
before concluding that life without any possibility of parole was the appropriate penalty.”67
Of course, as a functional matter, sentencing hearings are not the only
time and place at which punishment is determined. Sentencing is a pipeline
in which decisions upstream greatly influence punishment determinations
downstream.68 In a world of plea bargaining and sentencing guidelines,
prosecutors have at least as much effective sentencing power as do judges. In
theory, prosecutors could individualize as well, charging only the most deserving juveniles with crimes that can trigger LWOP. So too could judges at
the point of transfer (often called waiver) of a juvenile from the juvenile

62. See Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1752–66.
63. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2466 (“By removing youth from the balance . . . [laws
mandating LWOP sentences] prohibit a sentencing authority from assessing whether the law’s
harshest term of imprisonment proportionally punishes a juvenile offender.”); Graham, 130 S.
Ct. at 2027–30 (“By denying the defendant the right to reenter the community, the State
makes an irrevocable judgment about that person’s value and place in society. This judgment
is not appropriate in light of a juvenile nonhomicide offender’s capacity for change and limited moral culpability.”).
64. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2469.
65. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030 (“[T]he State must . . . give [juvenile, nonhomicide]
defendants . . . some meaningful opportunity to obtain release based on demonstrated maturity and rehabilitation.”); see also Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1776 (observing that Graham
“diversif[ied] sentencing across time and institutions”).
66. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028–30.
67. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467, 2469.
68.

Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27, at 37.
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courts into the criminal courts.69 Alabama and Arkansas argued as much in
Miller.70
Graham and Miller recognized that things do not work that way in practice. Waiver from juvenile to criminal courts, which historically required an
individualized, case-by-case judicial determination as an independent check
on the prosecution of juveniles, is now often mandatory or left to prosecutors’ sole discretion.71 Where it is mandatory, legislatures may not have
thought through the interplay of automatic waiver with mandatory and generally applicable sentencing laws that appear in far-removed sections of
code.72
Even where judges retain some discretion, it has “limited utility.”73
Judges at the waiver stage often have little information. They do not know
what they will learn about the offender or the offense over the course of later
proceedings. Furthermore, the procedural rights that would help a juvenile
to make a case against waiver—for example, the right to put on a mental
health expert, which the juvenile in Miller unsuccessfully attempted to do—
do not kick in until trial.74 The all-or-nothing nature of waiver also presents
judges with “a choice between extremes”: the light punishment as a child
that many juvenile systems require versus the standard, undifferentiated,
harsh punishment that applies to an adult.75 Judges who otherwise would
take a middle course might err on the side of caution.76 Prosecutors face the
same calculus in states that commit waiver exclusively to their discretion.
The Miller Court noted that prosecutorial waiver statutes “are usually silent
69. Waiver or transfer is a necessary prerequisite for bringing criminal charges against
juveniles tried as adults. See, e.g., Nat’l Research Council & Inst. of Med., Juvenile
Crime, Juvenile Justice 206–09 (Joan McCord et al. eds., 2001).
70. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474.
71. See, e.g., Martha Rossiter, Comment, Transferring Children to Adult Criminal Court:
How to Best Protect Our Children and Society, 27 J. Juv. L. 123, 126, 128–31 (2006) (reviewing
and critiquing mandatory waiver laws); Melissa A. Scott, Comment, The “Critically Important”
Decision of Waiving Juvenile Court Jurisdiction: Who Should Decide?, 50 Loy. L. Rev. 711, 712,
728–29 (2004) (reviewing factors to be considered in waiver decisions); see also Ark. Code
Ann. § 9-27-318(a) (2009) (restricting the state’s use of juvenile delinquency proceedings to
cases involving juveniles under age fifteen or juveniles under age eighteen whose conduct
would have constituted a misdemeanor if committed by an adult); Ga. Code Ann. § 15-1128(b)(2)(A) (2012) (providing criminal court with exclusive jurisdiction over children ages
thirteen to seventeen who are alleged to have committed certain serious felonies).
72. See Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2473; Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2025–26 (2010);
Wayne A. Logan, Proportionality and Punishment: Imposing Life Without Parole on Juveniles, 33
Wake Forest L. Rev. 681, 718–20 (1998) (noting “the possibly unanticipated interplay” of
waiver and mandatory punishment statutes “often contained in disparate sections of a State’s
statute books” and observing that “it is unclear whether legislators comprehend the actual
consequences of their radical measures to overhaul criminal justice”).
73. Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2474.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. See id. at 2474–75. That is particularly true for elected state judges faced with a
juvenile who has committed a serious crime.
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regarding standards, protocols, or appropriate considerations for decisionmaking.”77 It might have added that prosecutors seeking maximum leverage
frequently use waiver as a plea-bargaining chip rather than an equitable tool
of individualized justice.78
These observations from Graham and Miller also touch on a broader
theme. They recognize, at least implicitly, that the fundamental structure of
juvenile justice is unbalanced. The same imbalances that skew criminal justice—harsh penalties, overbroad laws that shift power to prosecutors and tie
judges’ hands, and a lack of safety valves—infect juvenile justice even more.
Graham and Miller can be seen as the Court’s first, tentative steps to restore
some checks and balances to the system, much as the Court groped its way
toward a similar end in its early capital punishment cases.79
b. Apprendi
If the Graham and Miller approach to checks and balances was implicit
and functionalist, focusing on the realities of juvenile justice and adolescent
development, Apprendi’s approach was explicit and formalist, stressing the
jury’s position as fact finder in our constitutional system of separated powers. In applying the jury-trial guarantee to New Jersey’s hate-crime statute,
the Court emphasized the jury’s role in “guard[ing] against a spirit of oppression and tyranny on the part of our rulers.”80 Rachel Barkow, William
Stuntz, and others have shown how the jury’s historical prerogative to
render unreviewable judgments of acquittal acted as a powerful check on the
authority of legislatures, executives, and judges.81 The Court’s bright-line
rule embraced that vision, tying the jury-trial right to any facts that raise

77. Id. at 2474 (quoting Patrick Griffin et al., Office of Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Trying Juveniles as Adults: An Analysis of State Transfer Laws and Reporting 5 (2011), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdf
files1/ojjdp/232434.pdf).
78. See Lisa S. Beresford, Comment, Is Lowering the Age at Which Juveniles Can Be
Transferred to Adult Criminal Court the Answer to Juvenile Crime? A State-by-State Assessment,
37 San Diego L. Rev. 783, 806 (2000) (“[T]he state can use the potential for transfer and the
ability to appeal transfer decisions as a bargaining chip.”); Lisa A. Cintron, Comment, Rehabilitating the Juvenile Court System: Limiting Juvenile Transfers to Adult Criminal Court, 90 Nw. U.
L. Rev. 1254, 1267 (1996) (discussing the incentives for even innocent juveniles to take pleas
that will keep them in juvenile court).
79. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 364–403 (exhaustively reviewing the development of the Court’s capital punishment case law).
80. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 477 (2000) (quoting 2 Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States 540–41 (4th ed. 1873)); see also
Jones v. United States, 526 U.S. 227, 245 (1999) (noting the jury’s historical “power to thwart
Parliament and Crown”).
81. Stuntz, supra note 13, at 30, 304; Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 9, at
48–65; see also Laura I. Appleman, The Plea Jury, 85 Ind. L.J. 731, 750–68 (2010).
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statutory or (as Blakely and Booker later made clear) guidelines-based maximum sentences.82 Whereas Graham and Miller shifted authority from legislatures to judges at the front end of the process and from judges to parole
boards at the back end, Apprendi sought to shift authority from legislatures
and judges to juries.
Individualization and moral appropriateness figured critically in the Apprendi line as well, although it takes some work to see how. Doctrinally, we
usually think of these concepts as Eighth Amendment requirements. Apprendi approached sentencing via the Sixth Amendment, resting on the
jury’s historical prerogative to find all elements of a crime.83 Today, finding
facts that constitute elements of a crime is not the same as determining an
individual defendant’s sentence.84 At common law, however, “[t]he substantive criminal law tended to be sanction-specific; it prescribed a particular
sentence for each offense.”85 In such cases, the jury’s verdict determined the
defendant’s sentence. Juries also retained the power to find the defendant
guilty of any lesser-included offense. Juries, as the Court observed in Beck v.
Alabama, could thus “create[ ] their own sentencing discretion” by acquitting a defendant of a more serious charge.86 Early juries in both England and
the colonies did so with some regularity where they believed a sanction too
harsh as applied to a particular defendant.87
The Sixth Amendment thus guarantees juries a role as the “conscience
of the community,” best situated to inject common-sense moral judgment
into concrete cases.88 The jury’s role is “to fit the circumstances of individual
cases”89 and make the “context-specific, retrospective assessments of the offender and his wrongdoing [that] are intrinsic to just punishment.”90 Again,
while individual prosecutors could in theory also make such judgments during charging and bargaining, the realities of prosecutorial decisionmaking
82. United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 230–33 (2005); Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 303–04 (2004); Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490.
83. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 476–77.
84. Indeed, as we discuss below, modern juries do not even know the potential
sentences that their verdicts will authorize. See infra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.
85. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 479.
86. 447 U.S. 625, 640 (1980).
87. See Thomas Andrew Green, Verdict According to Conscience: Perspectives
on the English Criminal Trial Jury 1200–1800, at 313–15, 360 (1985) (analyzing the history of jury discretion together with official acquiescence in the exercise of that discretion);
John H. Langbein, Shaping the Eighteenth-Century Criminal Trial: A View from the Ryder
Sources, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 54–55 (1983).
88. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 (1968); see also Jenia Iontcheva, Jury
Sentencing as Democratic Practice, 89 Va. L. Rev. 311, 382 (2003) (arguing that “[b]ecause of
its ability to render individualized judgments and to reconcile conflicting views through deliberation rather than aggregation,” the jury is best suited for making democratically and morally
legitimate sentencing judgments).
89. William E. Nelson, Americanization of the Common Law: The Impact of
Legal Change on Massachusetts Society, 1760–1830, at 28–29 (2d ed. 1994).
90. Kyron Huigens, Correspondence, What Is and Is Not Pathological in Criminal Law,
101 Mich. L. Rev. 811, 818 (2002).
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are different. Individual sentencing judges have somewhat more leeway, but
even their hands are often tied by mandatory sentences, guidelines, and
prosecutors’ upstream decisions. Even when judges do have room to make
sentencing decisions, they “lack[ ] the community perspective of the jury.”91
As Jenia Iontcheva explains, “Because of their deliberative capacity and democratic makeup, juries are better situated . . . to perform the sensitive tasks
of deciding between contested sentencing goals and applying the law with
due regard for the individual circumstances of each offender.”92 The jury
acts as a critical institutional check on prosecutorial and legislative overreaching, bringing individualized, community judgment to bear.93 That need
to fit the punishment to the crime explains Apprendi’s emphasis on the
jury’s role in “authoriz[ing]” a particular maximum punishment in a particular case by its guilty verdict.94
These structural aspects of the jury’s role in ensuring just, individualized punishment share much in common with the institutional-design features of Woodson/Lockett/Eddings, Graham, and Miller. The Court’s Apprendi
jurisprudence has not engaged these parallels, rigidly tying the jury’s checking function to its fact-finding power.95 But some individual justices have
acknowledged the connection. Justice Stevens, who authored Apprendi, has
twice argued that the Eighth Amendment requires jury sentencing in capital
cases because juries “more accurately reflect the conscience of the community than can a single judge” and are best suited for making the textured,
granular, and fundamentally normative judgments that give punishment decisions their “moral and constitutional legitimacy.”96 Justice Breyer embraced the same view in Ring v. Arizona.97 Ring applied Apprendi to require
jury fact-finding of aggravating factors in capital cases.98 Justice Breyer, the
standard-bearer for the Apprendi dissenters, concurred in the judgment on
the ground that the Eighth Amendment, not the Sixth, required jury sentencing in such cases.99 Juries, he noted, possess a unique comparative advantage over judges in assigning blame because “they are more attuned to
91. Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 9, at 85. Judges also lack juries’ insulation
from appellate review at the behest of the government. See id. at 48–49, 60–61.
92. Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 350; see also Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 9,
at 72–93 & nn.178–81.
93. That is not to say that juries have worked perfectly in practice or that they are
essential in the abstract to fair punishment. See infra text accompanying notes 151–152.
94. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 494 (2000); accord Blakely v. Washington, 542
U.S. 296, 305 (2004) (establishing that “the jury’s verdict alone does not authorize the sentence” ultimately imposed).
95. See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 244 (2005); Blakely, 542 U.S. at 312–13;
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002).
96. Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447, 483, 487, (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); see also Harris v. Alabama, 513 U.S. 504, 515–26 (1995) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
97. 536 U.S. at 614 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
98. Id. at 606–08 (majority opinion).
99. Id. at 613–19 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment).
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the community’s moral sensibility.”100 Even Justice Scalia, who rejected Justice Breyer’s approach in Ring,101 has noted the overlap. He observed that the
Woodson/Lockett/Eddings requirement that sentencing juries be allowed to
consider all mitigating evidence “meant to ensure that [they] would function as a ‘link between contemporary community values and the penal
system.’ ”102
C. The Limits of Rights-Based Solutions
Despite their structural dimensions, both the Graham and Apprendi
lines took a narrow doctrinal approach to the issues before them. The institutional design features just discussed are often immanent in the decisions,
lying just below the surface. Doctrinally, the cases sound in individual
rights: the Eighth Amendment’s right to avoid suffering “cruel and unusual
punishments” in Graham and the Sixth Amendment’s “right to . . . trial[ ]
by an impartial jury” on all elements of a crime in Apprendi.103 The Court
had to root its doctrinal analysis somewhere, and those Amendments may
well have been the best candidates. The Constitution, after all, hardly guarantees perfection in either criminal justice or constitutional interpretation.
But by hewing closely to that constitutional frame, the decisions warped the
Court’s responses to the problems and obscured broader systemic
considerations.
Take Graham and Miller first. Both decisions rested on the Eighth
Amendment’s individual rights framework of substantive proportionality.
But neither is easily explainable using traditional substantive-proportionality
concepts, which forced the Court to bend existing doctrine to justify the
cases. For example, by its own terms, Graham does not prevent juveniles
from being denied parole and spending their lives in prison.104 It is hard to
see how such a discretionary life sentence is less disproportionate than a
mandatory one without looking to a problematic measure of severity beyond sentence length, such as “expected value” or the hopelessness that can
accompany LWOP.105 Such inquiries could radically expand Eighth Amendment proportionality law, sweeping conditions of confinement and similar
circumstances within its scope. Graham’s forward-looking focus on

100. Id. at 615 (quoting Spaziano, 468 U.S. at 481 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
101. Id. at 612–13 (Scalia, J., concurring).
102. Morgan v. Illinois, 504 U.S. 719, 745 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (quoting
Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 519 n.15 (1968)).
103. U.S. Const. amends. VI, VIII.
104. In his opinion for the Court, Justice Kennedy stressed that the Eighth Amendment
neither guaranteed nor required their eventual release; nor did the Court establish any criteria
to guide release decisions. Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2030, 2034 (2010).
105. See Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1759–64; Alice Ristroph, Hope, Imprisonment,
and the Constitution, 23 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 75, 77 (2010).
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juveniles’ plasticity also sits uneasily with the Eighth Amendment’s traditional retrospective approach to culpability.106 Moreover, because the prospect of LWOP almost certainly increases deterrence, Graham’s holding
seems to undercut deterrence.107 That conflicts with the Court’s oft-repeated
statement that a sentence is not disproportionate so long as it serves a legitimate penological end.108
The individual rights framework also masks internal inconsistencies between Graham and Miller themselves. Viewed through the lens of substantive proportionality, the decisions are not much in tension. If one sets aside
the doctrinal issues just mentioned and accepts that LWOP is more severe
than life with the possibility of parole, the approach makes sense: Miller
allows discretionary imposition of the more severe punishment for juveniles
who have killed, while Graham forbids that punishment altogether for
juveniles who have committed less serious crimes.
But the picture is murkier if we look at how the decisions allocate sentencing authority. Miller’s ban on mandatory LWOP shifts sentencing authority from legislatures and prosecutors to judges and juries, who now
make the final call on life imprisonment at sentencing. It assumes that
judges and juries can be trusted to individualize at the time of sentencing
and to forecast whether a juvenile killer must remain in prison for life. But
Graham, in turn, shifts authority from judges and juries to parole boards,
which make the final call on life imprisonment in parole hearings. That runs
counter to Miller because it suggests that only a parole board can reliably
evaluate at a later time whether someone who committed a crime as a juvenile truly deserves a life sentence. Moreover, in requiring an opportunity for
parole, Graham stressed that juveniles can change and that front-end
sentencers cannot judge their “true character” at the outset.109 But “none of
what it said about children—about their distinctive (and transitory) mental
traits and environmental vulnerabilities—is crime-specific.”110 If that is true,
then it is unclear why the two cases allocated sentencing authority
differently.
106. See Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1757–59.
107. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2053–54 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The Court acknowledges
that such sentences will deter future juvenile offenders, at least to some degree, but rejects that
penological goal, not as illegitimate, but as insufficient.”); see also Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S.
551, 621 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The Court’s contention that the goals of retribution
and deterrence are not served by executing murderers under 18 is . . . transparently false.”).
108. See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028; Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 999–1000
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). As Justice O’Connor
observed in Ewing v. California, decisions about penological purposes are generally seen as
legislative choices to which reviewing courts owe deference, particularly under principles of
federalism. 538 U.S. 11, 25 (2003) (plurality opinion) (“Our traditional deference to legislative
policy choices finds a corollary in the principle that the Constitution ‘does not mandate adoption of any one penological theory.’ ” (quoting Harmelin, 501 U.S. at 999 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment))).
109. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2032–33.
110.

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2465 (2012).
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The deeper problem is that the Court viewed both cases primarily as
matters of substantive individual rights. Thus, it did not say nearly enough
about sentencing procedures and structures. For instance, the Court neglected real issues with how parole boards exercise (or fail to exercise) their
discretion. That neglect could give front-end sentencers an easy out, push
sentencing discretion into an opaque body, and make parole seem possible
or likely even if it is rarely granted in practice.111 In Miller, the Court did
reject exclusive reliance on wholesale legislative judgments and prosecutorial
charging decisions but otherwise barely considered where sentencing discretion should lie and why.
Apprendi presents similar issues. The Court again cast its holding in
terms of an individual right. And it linked that right to the substantive criminal law by holding that any fact that increases the maximum punishment
authorized by law is an element of an offense that must be proved to a
jury.112 But the Court’s wooden focus on the right to jury fact-finding ignored the larger goal of ensuring that the system checks and individualizes
sentencing. Whereas colonial juries knew the punishment for given crimes
and could mitigate sentences by convicting the defendant of a lesser-included offense, today most jurisdictions forbid judges and parties to tell jurors about penalties.113 Capital juries probably understand that their
affirmative findings will authorize the death penalty, but noncapital juries
have no similar sense of their role in sentencing. Juries cannot tailor and
individualize punishments when they do not know them, no matter how
many additional facts they are empowered to find.114 Thus, although Apprendi’s and Blakely’s reasoning sounds in individualization, their holdings
fail to accomplish that end.
Apprendi’s inattention to modern criminal justice, moreover, may have
exacerbated its structural imbalances. While Apprendi purported to limit
legislative power to delegate sentencing enhancements to judges, it could
spur more delegation, not less. The formalism of the Court’s rule creates
incentives for evasion by legislatures that can simply draft around the rule by
raising statutory maxima across the board and then allow sentencing judges
to mitigate down, either on their own or employing legislatively specified
111. See Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1779–82.
112.

Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 495–96 (2000).

113. Kristen K. Sauer, Note, Informed Conviction: Instructing the Jury About Mandatory
Sentencing Consequences, 95 Colum. L. Rev. 1232, 1242 (1995) (“The general rule in federal
and most state judicial systems is that neither the judge nor advocates should inform the jury
of the sentencing consequences of a guilty verdict.”); see also Shannon v. United States, 512
U.S. 573, 580 (1994) (noting the “principle that jurors are not to be informed of the consequences of their verdicts”). While states are permitted to use jury sentencing, only six states
use it in noncapital cases. Nancy J. King & Rosevelt L. Noble, Felony Jury Sentencing in Practice:
A Three-State Study, 57 Vand. L. Rev. 885, 886 (2004).
114. See Colleen P. Murphy, Integrating the Constitutional Authority of Civil and Criminal Juries, 61 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 723, 736–37 (1993) (arguing that a mere fact-finding function for the criminal jury would make it an “imperfect check[ ] on the possible abuse of power
by legislators, prosecutors, or law enforcement officials”).
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mitigating factors.115 Although the Apprendi majority recognized the “hypothetical[ ]” danger of legislative evasion, it believed that “structural democratic constraints” would prevent legislatures from raising maxima above
what is “generally proportional to the crime.”116 But the Court’s faith in
those (unspecified) constraints was too rosy because tough-on-crime legislators score points with both voters and prosecutors by circumventing prodefendant rules when they can.117
Apprendi’s myopic focus on jury fact-finding at trial also likely strengthened prosecutors’ already-dominant hand in plea bargaining. Before Apprendi, judges could exercise at least some discretion to consider certain
underlying facts when sentencing offenders after plea bargains, so long as
they did so within the statutory range. Apprendi, however, converted many
of those facts into elements of crimes that prosecutors could fix ex ante
through charging and hence use as bargaining chips to exact pleas.118
By glossing over the systemic values served by the Sixth and Eighth
Amendments, both lines of decisions overlooked important structural questions. For instance, if Apprendi’s jury-trial right really serves deep structural
values, why should it be waivable, as Justice Scalia has stressed that it is?119
One might think that the right should carry not less but more force in plea
bargaining, which invites collusion behind closed doors and bypasses any
real judicial checks. Likewise, if “structural democratic constraints” are sufficient to protect against escalating penalties and higher maxima and minima
in the Sixth Amendment context, why are they not also sufficient in the
Eighth Amendment context? Miller slighted Eighth Amendment deference to
state legislative judgments, refusing to defer to a near-consensus among
states that LWOP is appropriate for juveniles who have killed.120 The Court’s
reasons for doing so apparently had less to do with substantive proportionality concerns than with institutional competence and the inability or unwillingness of state legislatures to individualize ex ante. But it is hard to see
why similar concerns should not inform the Court’s view of legislatures in
Apprendi.
To be clear, we are not saying that the Sixth and Eighth Amendments
are or should be irrelevant to curing criminal justice’s structural ills. Nor are
we complaining that the Court did not use those amendments to effect more
115. See Stephanos Bibas, How Apprendi Affects Institutional Allocations of Power, 87
Iowa L. Rev. 465, 468 (2002).
116. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490 n.16.
117. See Nancy J. King & Susan R. Klein, Essential Elements, 54 Vand. L. Rev. 1467,
1488–92, 1546 app. A (2001) (cataloguing repeated instances in which courts left legislatures
leeway to adopt pro-prosecution rules and noting that many legislatures in fact did so); supra
notes 19–24 and accompanying text.
118. See Bibas, supra note 115, at 472.
119. See Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 310 (2004) (“If appropriate waivers are
procured, States may continue to offer judicial factfinding as a matter of course to all defendants who plead guilty. . . . We do not understand how Apprendi can possibly work to the
detriment of those who are free . . . to render it inapplicable.”).
120. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2475 (2012).
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sweeping structural reforms. Rather, our claim is that judicial attention to
rights-based doctrines can go only so far to remedy the structural imbalances at the root of the problem. What is called for is a more direct engagement with the structural concerns underlying Graham and Apprendi,
including a more sustained focus on the roles of various actors and on empowering those actors to check and balance one another throughout sentencing. The next two Parts take up that task.
II. The Procedural Justice of Sentencing
While judicial reliance on individual constitutional rights alone cannot
solve the problem, it can spur other actors to build on the Court’s constitutional foundation. Much as the Court’s procedural regulation of capital sentencing prompted nonjudicial reforms, this Part explains how a processoriented understanding of the Court’s recent turn to noncapital sentencing
can illuminate how policymakers should structure criminal justice. On the
most basic level, as Section II.A notes, it refocuses the constitutional sentencing inquiry less on what is decided than on who decides and how they
do so. Section II.B explores the strengths and weaknesses of the various institutions and actors involved, sketching the broad outlines of how fragmented sentencing authority serves the values at the heart of the Graham
and Apprendi lines. Section II.C defends that structural and process-based
approach to sentencing as normatively desirable. It explains how the institutional collaboration that characterizes that approach goes hand in hand with
a democratic criminal law system characterized by competing moral visions
and diverse viewpoints.
A.

Structure, Process, and Punishment

At sentencing, who decides and how they decide greatly influence what
gets decided. That insight is the core of our structural account. The Constitution, in other words, promotes just punishment less by adopting any particular substantive vision of punishment than by regulating the structural
and procedural rules that determine punishments. Substantive criminal law,
Justice Marshall observed in Powell v. Texas, involves a “constantly shifting
adjustment of the tension between the evolving aims of the criminal law and
the changing religious, moral, philosophical, and medical views of the nature of man.”121 A process-oriented approach embraces that view by emphasizing moral appropriateness, individualization, and checks and balances as
key ingredients in determining just punishment. While retribution, loosely
conceived, plays a central role, that approach is open to incorporating a mix
of other goals and values as well. Each actor has a role to play in checking
the others and defining or refining moral appropriateness; just punishment
121. 392 U.S. 514, 535–36 (1968) (plurality opinion). The Court has made similar observations numerous times since. See, e.g., Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 998–1001
(1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Payne v. Tennessee,
501 U.S. 808, 824–25 (1991).
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is the balance that emerges from that process. We see both Apprendi and
Graham as proceeding from this same constitutional core, notwithstanding
their different doctrinal hooks and interpretive approaches.
This process narrative that Apprendi and Graham share has received little attention in the criminal law literature. Consistent with the Court’s doctrinal emphasis, the dominant approach to understanding Graham and
Miller has focused on individual rights and regulating substantive outcomes.122 Likewise, as Rachel Barkow notes, commentators analyzing Apprendi have for the most part focused on the scope of the Sixth Amendment
right instead of viewing the issue broadly as one of separated powers.123 Barkow is one of the few scholars who approach the topic from a structural
constitutional perspective. She advocates a strict separation of powers in
criminal cases, including more directly enforcing a jury’s prerogative to find
any facts that determine punishment.124 The strength of this formalistic approach, she argues, is that it prevents shortsighted expediency from eroding
long-term structural considerations.125
But that very strength of separation-of-powers formalism can also be a
weakness in a criminal justice system that diverges radically from the one
known by the Framers. As long as the Court is unwilling to dynamite the
plea-bargaining edifice, it cannot return juries from their current cameo appearance to a starring role night after night.126 Functionalism is a more
promising way to translate these constitutional values into twenty-first-century criminal justice. At the same time, courts likely have neither the institutional competence nor the desire to fine-tune the constitutional law of
sentencing. Other actors, prompted by the Court, must develop new structural and procedural rules that can help to check legislatures and prosecutors within the edifice of plea bargaining. Indeed, another of Barkow’s
articles begins down this path, suggesting ways to check and separate functions within prosecutors’ offices through rules of institutional design.127
Lou Bilionis, writing before Apprendi and Graham, offers a different
structural account. Bilionis argues that many of the Court’s substantive constitutional criminal law cases—including many of the capital punishment
122. See Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1783–84, 1783 n.177.
123.

Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 9, at 44–45.

124. Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 9, at 1035–40, 1042–43; see also Barkow,
Recharging the Jury, supra note 9, at 107–10, 116.
125.

Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 9, at 1037–38.

126. This difficulty with a strict formalist approach is not limited to criminal justice. It
plagues every attempt to rigidly enforce the separation of powers in the modern administrative
state. See, e.g., Peter B. McCutchen, Mistakes, Precedent, and the Rise of the Administrative State:
Toward a Constitutional Theory of the Second Best, 80 Cornell L. Rev. 1, 11 (1994) (defending
the rigidity of formalism while acknowledging that its strict application would render the
administrative state unconstitutional); Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to
Separation of Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 526 (1987)
(“[F]ormalism . . . is simply incapable of describing the government we have.”).
127.

Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 9, at 895–906.
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cases discussed above—rest on process considerations. Specifically, he asserts that the Court consciously privileges legislative primacy to shape criminal law and interferes only to correct legislative breakdowns or to protect
politically disfavored groups.128 Bilionis endorses this classic “process reinforcement” approach as respecting democracy and federalism by letting political communities shape the content of their substantive criminal laws.129
His respect for structural values is admirable and rarely heard within criminal procedure. But it operates primarily ex ante, at a high level of legislative
abstraction. It downplays the need for a range of other actors to individualize sentences ex post, at the retail level, to tailor legislative policy choices.130
In Apprendi and Graham, the Court took a less pure approach than either of these, applying a jumble of interpretive methodologies and constitutional provisions. The broad arc of that approach might be seen as vaguely
neo-originalist. Colonial criminal justice largely put its faith in procedure,
not substantive review of guilt, to check governmental power and to ensure
individualized, morally appropriate judgments.131 Separation of powers and
checks and balances—most importantly, citizen involvement through the
jury’s inscrutable province to nullify unjust laws and harsh sentences—were
indispensable parts of ensuring due process for individual citizens.132 The
Court’s recent cases are re-creating the functional equivalents of those structures under the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, fine-tuning who decides
what, when, and how.

128.

Bilionis, supra note 10, at 1327–32.

129. Id. at 1302–04. No reference to process-oriented or structural approaches to criminal law scholarship would be complete without mention of the late William Stuntz, whose
work broadly unpacked the political economy of modern criminal justice and constitutional
criminal procedure. For a sampling of Stuntz’s highly influential work in the field, see Stuntz,
supra note 13; Stuntz, supra note 19; William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal
Justice, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 780 (2006); and William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between
Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 Yale L.J. 1 (1997).
130. In another article published seven years earlier, Bilionis praised the Woodson/Lockett/Eddings doctrine as providing a way for courts to remain agnostic among competing theories of punishment while empowering sentencers to exercise morally appropriate judgment in
imposing the death penalty. He saw the need for rationality and predictability at a systemic
level as quite consistent with giving sentencers discretion to judge moral appropriateness in
individual cases. Bilionis, supra note 42, at 286–87. That article did not, however, connect
these Lockett-specific insights to a broader understanding of the structure of modern criminal
justice, checks and balances, or the design of noncapital sentencing.
131. See Stuntz, supra note 13, at 74–79.
132. See, e.g., Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights 129–33 (1998); Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Essay, Due Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672,
1682–84, 1703–06, 1717–20 (2012) (discussing the evolution of the jury’s role as a check
against the sovereign in the Magna Carta and the incorporation of these English ideas into
American law).
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That approach resembles the Court’s approach, beginning in the 1970s,
to reforming capital sentencing. The Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence was prompted by concerns about arbitrariness and unfairness in sentencing.133 It has been roundly criticized for imposing enormous costs on the
system and legitimizing the death penalty while doing little to achieve equality.134 But, as Douglas Berman puts it, “[W]hatever one’s perspective . . . on
the modern administration of capital punishment, the system at least has the
benefit of subjecting prosecutors’ sentencing judgments and discretionary
decisions . . . to a series of meaningful . . . ‘second looks.’ There are, in other
words, considerable checks and balances surrounding the actions and discretionary decisions of prosecutors . . . .”135 At the same time, the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence, like its ad hoc approach in Apprendi and
Graham, responded haphazardly to specific unfairnesses.136 Apprendi and
Graham show the Court starting down that same road. Their doctrines
might be less stilted if the Court instead recognized them as creating checks
and balances for giving content to punishment norms, or even as serving
due process by addressing the structures needed to ensure fundamental fairness.137 Rather than repeating the haphazardness of capital sentencing law,
we should think more systematically at the outset about how to allocate
sentencing authority.
B. Punishment and Institutional Competence
So how should different criminal justice actors share sentencing authority to best check and balance one another? While we cannot answer this
question here exhaustively, we can at least glean a few broad lessons from
133. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 193–95 (1976) (plurality opinion);
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 293–95 (1972) (Brennan, J., concurring).
134. See, e.g., Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Atkins v. Virginia: Lessons from
Substance and Procedure in the Constitutional Regulation of Capital Punishment, 57 DePaul L.
Rev. 721, 731 (2008) (criticizing the Court’s treatment of the death penalty for offenders with
mental disabilities); Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 426–38. See generally Louis D. Bilionis,
Legitimating Death, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 1643, 1647–48 & nn.18–23 (1993) (collecting
criticisms).
135.

Berman, supra note 51, at 432–33.

136.

Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 397–98.

137. As David Ball observes, Apprendi gestured in that direction initially. See W. David
Ball, The Civil Case at the Heart of Criminal Procedure: In re Winship, Stigma, and the
Civil–Criminal Distinction, 38 Am. J. Crim. L. 117, 141–42 (2011). The Court emphasized
both the Sixth Amendment and due process aspects of its holding, relying on what it called
“[In re] Winship’s due process and associated jury protections.” Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530
U.S. 466, 484 (2000); see also id. at 469 (“The question presented is whether the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that . . . an increase in the maximum prison
sentence . . . be made by a jury on the basis of proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Winship, in
turn, took a functional and flexible approach to due process, balancing the interests at stake
and requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt for juvenile commitment proceedings as an
aspect of fundamental fairness. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 365–68 (1970); see also Ball, supra,
at 138–39.

424

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 112:397

what we have said above. The first is that legislatures cannot administer sentencing on their own. In a representative democracy, legislatures have the
prerogative to establish sentencing policies that track the will of the majority. That includes “mak[ing] difficult choices among opposing moral and
ideological viewpoints.”138 In reality, legislatures often gloss over or punt on
such issues. Even when they do not, they still craft rules and calibrate punishments only in the most general manner. Legislatures’ ex ante, abstract
perspective makes them especially well suited to ranking categories of crimes
and grouping broadly alike cases together to achieve some rough equality in
sentencing.139 But because they cannot tailor rules to capture the nuances of
particular cases, they are ill suited to furthering equality’s other aspect of
treating unlike cases unalike.
The same problem applies to sentencing commissions, to which legislatures often delegate their authority to make more specific sentencing rules.
No matter how detailed those rules become, they cannot capture ex ante all
the relevant differences among cases. Rules can promote consistency to a
point, but overly precise or rigid rules risk doing the opposite. As the implementation of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines showed, overprecision exacerbates inequality by forcing dissimilar cases into the same sentencing box.140
That creates the same kind of “false consistency” that the Woodson/Lockett/
Eddings trilogy sought to remedy.141 In short, ex ante rule creation is not the
same as ex post applied moral judgment.142
Prosecutors, judges, juries, and parole boards are all better positioned
than are legislatures and sentencing commissions to make textured, individualized sentencing determinations. Yet prosecutors have their own incentives
to stack up convictions and plea-bargaining chips, and their decisions are
often driven by habits of charging and plea bargaining divorced from the
merits.143 Thus, prosecutors’ exercise of their unreviewable charging power is
suspect as a way to ensure individualized justice.144
138.

Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 350; see also Bilionis, supra note 10, at 1302.

139. Paul H, Robinson et al., The Modern Irrationalities of American Criminal Codes: An
Empirical Study of Offense Grading, 100 J. Crim. L. & Criminology 709, 715–17 (2010);
Robinson & Spellman, supra note 24, at 1134–36, 1151 tbl.
140. See Kate Stith & José A. Cabranes, Fear of Judging: Sentencing Guidelines
in the Federal Courts 95–97, 104–06 (1998); Michael Tonry, Sentencing Matters
72–89 (1996).
141. Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104, 112 (1982); see also Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S.
586, 602 (1978) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he definition of crimes generally has not been
thought automatically to dictate what should be the proper penalty.”); Woodson v. North
Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“A process that accords no significance
to relevant facets of the character and record . . . . treats all persons convicted of a designated
offense not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to be subjected to the blind infliction of the penalty of death.”).
142. See Kyron Huigens, Solving the Apprendi Puzzle, 90 Geo. L.J. 387, 433 (2002).
143. See Bowers, supra note 17, at 1701–02.
144. See supra notes 16–17 and accompanying text.
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Judges, by contrast, fare better, especially where they are not hemmed in
by overly restrictive statutes or binding guidelines and where they have
enough case-specific information. Even then, however, “judges . . . may be
‘overconditioned’ and may not be able to appreciate the complexities and
moral nuances of individual cases.”145 A single judge, possibly appointed by
a governor, is also a less fitting representative of community values than is a
multimember lay body like a jury and is thus at greater risk of making sentencing decisions based on his own idiosyncratic political or moral views.146
Parole boards, unlike judges, are often multimember bodies, and they
have the additional perspective of evaluating a defendant’s reform while in
prison—a perspective that Graham and Miller viewed as critical to just sentencing for juveniles and perhaps others having the capacity for change.147
But like judges, they are often badly overconditioned, and their moral judgment may well diverge from that of the community. Like prosecutors, moreover, they often succumb to incentives to protect their own (and their
governors’) interests rather than to do justice in an individual case.148 Prosecutors, judges, and parole boards all have valuable roles to play, but each has
shortcomings that need to be checked.
That leaves juries. Juries, to use Iontcheva’s words, “bring both the legitimacy and the fresh perspective of a body made up of ordinary citizens.”149
More than any other actor, juries reflect and embody community values at
the retail level, giving them special competence to determine what punishment is appropriate in a given case.150 Their short-term service and lay
moral intuitions help them to focus on case-specific facets of individual
blameworthiness. And their role is built into the Sixth Amendment and our
nation’s history, not to mention our national sense of justice.
At the same time, juries’ lack of training and experience with criminal
justice might make them more prone to certain biases and less able to situate
sentences for particular crimes within the larger sentencing framework.151
They can thus be worse at considering systemic factors such as predictability, equality across cases, and resource allocation.152 Experts such as prosecutors, judges, and especially sentencing commissions are better equipped to
bring statistics and data to bear on these systemic problems. Juries are not
145. Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 353 (quoting Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522, 530
(1975)).
146. See id. at 352–53.
147. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2468 (2012); Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct.
2011, 2030, 2032–33 (2010).
148. See supra notes 31, 111 and accompanying text.
149. Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 353.
150. See supra notes 85–94 and accompanying text.
151. See Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 359; see also Cass R. Sunstein et al., Predictably
Incoherent Judgments, 54 Stan. L. Rev. 1153, 1158–59 (2002).
152. See, e.g., Charles O. Betts, Jury Sentencing, 2 Crime & Delinq. 369, 372 (1956);
Charles W. Webster, Jury Sentencing—Grab-Bag Justice, 14 Sw. L.J. 221, 228–29 (1960); Robert
A. Weninger, Jury Sentencing in Noncapital Cases: A Case Study of El Paso County, Texas, 45
Wash. U. J. Urb. & Contemp. L. 3, 24–29 (1994).
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perfect and need guidance by other actors. But they add a distinctive voice to
the broader conversation about how to make the punishment fit the crime,
helping to check and balance legislative and professional perspectives.153
C. The Virtues of Multiple Viewpoints
Legal scholars often adopt a monistic worldview. Retributivists may seek
exclusively to implement a particular Kantian or other deontological approach to punishment, while law-and-economics scholars may focus on the
monetizable costs and benefits of incapacitation and deterrence.154 In Isaiah
Berlin’s terminology, both kinds of scholars are hedgehogs, drawn to a simple, theoretically pure, unified ideal of substantive criminal justice.155 That
approach might seem to go hand in hand with a simplified criminal procedure, giving all power to an idealized legislature, an expert judge, or a prosecutor to neutrally weigh and apply that pure theory of justice.156
But, as the Apprendi and Graham lines of cases implicitly recognize,
real-world criminal justice needs both substantive and procedural pluralism.
We should be foxes, not hedgehogs. Although retributive blame is at the core
of punishment decisions, many actors must weigh a variety of other considerations as well. Thus, as this Section explains, Apprendi and Graham were
right to nudge the constitutional regulation of sentencing in a structural and
process-oriented direction. The core of our normative account is the need
for institutional collaboration to specify morally appropriate punishments,
153. For further elaboration of our vision of a polyphonic conversation including a
range of lay as well as expert voices and the distinctive strengths of each, see Bierschbach &
Bibas, supra note 27, at 20–24.
154. See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Mediating Rules in Criminal Law, 93 Va.
L. Rev. 1197, 1203–12 (2007). For useful surveys of retributivist theories, see Louis Kaplow &
Steven Shavell, Fairness Versus Welfare 294–317 (2002), and Michael Moore, Placing
Blame: A General Theory of the Criminal Law 104–88 (1997). For a classic discussion of
the economic approach to criminal justice, see Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of
Law 273–314 (8th ed. 2011).
155. See Isaiah Berlin, The Hedgehog and the Fox 3 (Ivan R. Dee 1993) (1953).
Berlin builds his distinction on the ancient Greek poet Archilocus’s saying: “The fox knows
many things, but the hedgehog knows one big thing.” Id. Hedgehog thinkers and writers, such
as Plato and Hegel, are monistic, viewing the world through the lens of a single defining idea
or value. Foxes, like Aristotle and Shakespeare, see complexity in the world and resist reducing
it to a single idea. Id. at 3–4.
156. That is not to say that other approaches would not be possible. A retributivist
might, for instance, vest power in a legislature to establish a broad ranking of the retributive
punishments available for various types of crimes, and in a judge, to work within that framework to tailor specific punishments to each defendant based on the particular moral circumstances of his crime. See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson et al., The Five Worst (and Five Best) American
Criminal Codes, 95 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1, 6, 12, 18–20 (2000) (discussing interplay between legislative specification and adjudicative discretion in laying down rules for grading of offenses in
accordance with the community’s sense of justice). But as Michael Cahill observes, most retributivists have not approached the issue that way, hewing instead to a philosopher-king
approach. See Michael T. Cahill, Retributive Justice in the Real World, 85 Wash. U. L. Rev. 815,
819 & n.13 (2007).
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both across and within individual cases. Such a system calls for both substantive and procedural pluralism and the give-and-take between actors and
perspectives that comes with it.157
1. Substantive Pluralism
Our democracy is pluralistic, and our system of criminal justice pursues
a wide array of competing values and objectives. As Henry Hart expressed it
in his classic, The Aims of the Criminal Law, because none of those values
and objectives wholly exclude the others, society’s criminal law choices demand “multivalued rather than . . . single-valued thinking.”158 Multivalued
approaches are often messy, and no philosopher or economist will ever be
satisfied with the resulting hash.159 But as a matter of political theory, a process that aggregates and reconciles the competing values is more democratically legitimate and responsive than one left entirely to a single
perspective.160
Criminal justice, for instance, is simultaneously forward- and backwardlooking. Many law-and-economics scholars focus on criminal law’s ex ante
effect of making the costs of committing a crime exceed the benefits for an
individual, which thus deters and reduces the costs of crime for society.161
That perspective calls for ensuring that police catch suspects; that prosecutors and juries apply clear, simple “decision rules”; and that judges mete out
predictable punishments.162 Some advocates of equality have likewise favored

157. Even if one disagrees with our normative stance, one could still accept the interpretive claims put forth in this Article; the two claims are analytically independent. One could,
in other words, agree with us that the Court is making the turn we describe in the constitutional law of noncapital sentencing but disagree that the turn is normatively desirable.
158. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law & Contemp. Probs.
401, 401 (1958).
159. This is, of course, a common feature of pluralistic approaches that respect multiple
competing substantive commitments. See, e.g., J.M. Balkin, Some Realism About Pluralism:
Legal Realist Approaches to the First Amendment, 1990 Duke L.J. 375, 387–94 (discussing the
relationship between democratic pluralism and First Amendment reform); Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Constitutionalism 14 (Nov. 7, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with
authors) (discussing the “multiple commitments” inherent in pluralistic approaches to religious freedom doctrine and explaining that “there is no obvious way to prioritize among
them”). See generally Pluralism in Economics: New Perspectives in History and Methodology (Andrea Salanti & Ernesto Screpanti eds., 1997).
160. For a more complete defense of this point, see Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27,
at 20–24.
161. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 154, at 279; Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment:
An Economic Approach, 76 J. Pol. Econ. 169, 180 (1968) (developing a classic economic model
of deterrence).
162. On the distinction between conduct rules and decision rules, see Meir Dan-Cohen,
Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
625 (1984).
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predictable ex ante rules that minimize official discretion and the possibility
of discrimination, arbitrariness, or unequal outcomes.163
But, as Graham and Miller make clear, blanket rules that look clear and
simple ex ante can be unjust ex post (that is, at the retail level of deciding
individual cases). Many retributivists stress the particulars of crimes and
criminals in ways that resist easy codification.164 Advocates of incapacitation,
rehabilitation, and reform may want to focus on a particular defendant,
looking at the particular danger he poses, his need for treatment, and his
remorse, repentance, and action to turn his life around.165 And fans of individualized justice stress that across-the-board sentencing rules promote formal equality at the expense of substantive inequality, treating unlike cases
alike. Our justice system needs both perspectives, balancing the ex ante and
ex post visions of the law. That means announcing fair conduct rules and
applying them even-handedly to give notice and predictability, yet leaving
room in applying decision rules for discretion to weigh and reflect particulars that cannot be codified.
More generally, there is great disagreement about how to weigh and
apply the varying purposes of punishment. Experts vary widely in the extent
to which they would direct criminal punishment toward serving public
safety, just deserts, mercy, and other goals.166 Scholars agree somewhat on
negative retributivism—that defendants should be punished no more than
they deserve—but much less on positive retributivism—that they should
ordinarily be punished as much as they deserve.167 Even retributivists vary
163. See, e.g., Marvin E. Frankel, Criminal Sentences: Law Without Order
(1973); Dan Markel, Luck or Law: Is Indeterminate Sentencing Unconstitutional? (May 24,
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors).
164. See, e.g., Douglas A. Berman, Distinguishing Offense Conduct and Offender Characteristics in Modern Sentencing Reforms, 58 Stan. L. Rev. 277, 289 (2005); Darryl K. Brown,
Third-Party Interests in Criminal Law, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 1383, 1408 (2002); Dan Markel, Against
Mercy, 88 Minn. L. Rev. 1421, 1445 (2004). See generally Cahill, supra note 156, at 836 (reviewing retributive approaches to criminal justice and concluding that they struggle to offer
any “firm rules about how to implement substantive criminal law”).
165. See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, Punishment as Atonement, 46 UCLA L. Rev. 1801,
1810–27 (1999); B. Douglas Robbins, Comment, Resurrection from a Death Sentence: Why
Capital Sentences Should Be Commuted upon the Occasion of an Authentic Ethical Transformation, 149 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1115 (2001) (arguing that an offender’s manifestation of the “trilogy”
of guilt, remorse, and penance should alter his punishment).
166. See, e.g., Don C. Gibbons, Changing the Lawbreaker 130 (2d ed. 1981) (arguing that the penal system should improve an offender’s future welfare through treatment);
H.L.A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 4–6 (2d ed. 2008) (observing that an offender deserves the punishment resulting from his freely willed choice to break the law); Andrew von Hirsch, Doing Justice 49 (1976) (rejecting the rehabilitative approach as unjust);
Frank Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Incapacitation 42–59, 131–72 (1995) (discussing the
public benefits of incapacitation and deterrence); Kyron Huigens, Dignity and Desert in Punishment Theory, 27 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 33 (2003) (criticizing consequentialism’s rejection
of value judgments in determining punishment).
167. Moore, supra note 154, at 153–87; Richard S. Frase, Limiting Retributivism, in
The Future of Imprisonment 83 (Michael Tonry ed., 2004); Michael Moore, Moral Reality,
1982 Wis. L. Rev. 1061, 1067–68.
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widely among themselves on the extent to which blame correlates with
wrongful intent, harm, and other criteria.168
Laymen agree somewhat more. Paul Robinson and his coauthors show
empirically that ordinary citizens ground their punishment intuitions primarily in retribution.169 But even so, citizens leave some room for other
principles, such as incapacitation, to temper the sentences they would impose.170 They also agree much less on how to translate their agreed-upon
ordinal rankings into absolute quantities of punishment.171 And there is little
agreement on how to reconcile lay and expert perspectives.
Given this range of constituencies and viewpoints, criminal justice cannot afford to be theoretically pure, sacrificing most other goals on a single
altar. As the Court’s cases acknowledge, widely shared retributive intuitions
belong at the core of our criminal justice system, founded as it is on democratic legitimacy. Even so, the law must simultaneously pursue deterrence,
incapacitation, reform, equality, mercy, consistency across cases, and a host
of other values that matter to both the public and professionals. It must
protect the public while taking individual defendants and victims seriously.
It must determine how severely to punish robbery in relation to other
crimes, yet it cannot simply stereotype a defendant as a typical robber. It
must individualize: that means looking at a robber’s own blameworthiness
and dangerousness, the harm he has done to a victim, his efforts to make
amends and apologize, and so on. Various actors can strive to weigh and
apply these purposes to individual cases fairly and justly, but there is no
abstract metric for fitting these values together. Retribution, for example,
takes shape in the crucible of these deliberations, case by case. Sentencing
thus becomes a conversation involving different institutional actors, all of
them bringing their own judgments to bear on how best to impose retribution, promote public safety, safeguard equality, and the like.172
168. Compare George P. Fletcher, Rethinking Criminal Law 857–58 (1978) (culpability-centered approach), with Paul H. Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as
a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. Rev. 266, 272–97 (1975) (harm-centered
approach), and David Wasserman, Justifying Self-Defense, 16 Phil. & Pub. Aff. 356 (1987)
(agency-based “forced choice” approach).
169. Kevin M. Carlsmith, The Roles of Retribution and Utility in Determining Punishment, 42 J. Experimental Soc. Psychol. 437, 443, 446 (2006) [hereinafter Carlsmith, The
Roles of Retribution and Utility]; Kevin M. Carlsmith et al., Why Do We Punish? Deterrence and
Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 83 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 284, 295–97
(2002); John M. Darley et al., Incapacitation and Just Deserts as Motives for Punishment, 24 Law
& Hum. Behav. 659, 667, 676 (2000).
170. See Carlsmith, The Roles of Retribution and Utility, supra note 169, at 443–45;
Darley et al., supra note 169, at 674–75.
171. Christopher Slobogin & Lauren Brinkley-Rubinstein, Putting Desert in Its Place, 65
Stan. L. Rev. 77, 94–96 (2013).
172. Harmelin v. Michigan, 501 U.S. 957, 996 (1991) (“[I]f petitioner’s sentence forecloses some ‘flexible techniques’ for later reducing his sentence . . . there remain the possibilities of retroactive legislative reduction and executive clemency.”); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S.
782, 797 (1982) (stating that when a judge decides whether to impose the death penalty, “the
judgments of legislatures, juries, and prosecutors weigh heavily in the balance”); Woodson v.
North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 298–99 (1976) (plurality opinion) (observing that “mandatory
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2. Procedural Pluralism
The eclectic hash of values and the institutional competencies of the
different actors involved in sentencing decisions demand a pluralistic procedural system.173 Procedurally, multiple actors can collaborate on designing,
running, and improving not only sentencing but also criminal justice in
general. For that to happen, the system must be not static but dynamic. That
means giving multiple actors the flexibility to experiment, collect feedback,
learn from their mistakes, and make changes. Actors and institutions need to
be able to cooperate on new projects, such as the structured-sentencing systems that have evolved in recent decades. Criminal procedure should encourage and channel such cooperation while remaining sensitive to the
abilities and limitations of the actors involved and the on-the-ground realities of their interactions.
Unfortunately, many of the Court’s recent criminal justice interventions
have fallen short of that mark, in part because the individual rights
frameworks they employ have proven to be blunt tools for institutional design. One example is how the Apprendi line of cases has at least partly damaged sentencing reform. Before Apprendi, structured sentencing had evolved
into a fruitful collaboration of multiple actors in various states seeking to
combat the problems of sentencing inequality and arbitrariness.174 Actors
sought to blend the benefits of wholesale and retail decisionmaking, expertise, and popular input to create systems more predictable than indeterminate sentencing systems yet less Procrustean than mandatory statutory
penalties.175 Many of these experiments were successful, such as Minnesota’s,
Washington’s, and North Carolina’s use of resource-impact statements to
help their commissions craft presumptive guidelines intended to “distribut[e] punishment under conditions of scarcity.”176 As Justice Kennedy
death penalty statutes ha[ve] been renounced by American juries and legislatures,” and that
these “enactments reflect attempts by the States to retain the death penalty in a form consistent with the Constitution”); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 175, 181 (1976) (plurality opinion) (“[T]he constitutional test [for determining just punishment] is intertwined with an
assessment of contemporary standards and the legislative judgment weighs heavily in ascertaining such standards. . . . The jury also is a significant reliable objective index of contemporary values because it is so directly involved.”).
173. Henry Hart again put it well when he observed that the value trade-offs involved
in criminal justice “do not present themselves . . . in an institutional vacuum.” Hart, supra
note 158, at 402. Thus, “each agency of decision must take account always of its own place in
the institutional system and of what is necessary to maintain the integrity and workability of
the system as a whole. A complex of institutional ends must be served . . . as well as a complex
of substantive social ends.” Id.
174. See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III, Debacle: How the Supreme Court Has Mangled
American Sentencing Law and How It Might Yet Be Mended, 77 U. Chi. L. Rev. 367, 374–76
(2010); John F. Pfaff, The Continued Vitality of Structured Sentencing Following Blakely: The
Effectiveness of Voluntary Guidelines, 54 UCLA L. Rev. 235, 241–46 (2006).
175. See Pfaff, supra note 174, at 241–46.
176. Dale G. Parent, What Did the United States Sentencing Commission Miss?, 101 Yale
L.J. 1773, 1786 (1992); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. Rev. 715,
771–87 (2005) (reviewing Minnesota’s, Washington’s, and North Carolina’s experiences);
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put it in his Blakely dissent, “This recurring dialogue . . . [is] an essential
source for the elaboration and the evolution of the law.”177 Legislatures,
judges, probation officers, and others need to cooperate continually to improve sentencing.178
But Apprendi and Blakely disrupted, if not upended, many of these experiments by rigidly insisting on jury fact-finding, even though in practice
plea bargaining has largely displaced juries today.179 The Apprendi Court’s
formalism blinded it to how its jury-driven check on sentencing power
could fail when implemented in a world of plea bargaining. The result has
been in many ways the worst of all worlds. In reality, the Apprendi/Blakely
line of cases further skewed the balance of power toward prosecutors and
away from judges based on “a faintly disguised distrust of judges,” leaving
juries’ abilities to affect sentences largely unchanged.180
Different actors have differing viewpoints and strengths. Legislatures
have democratic legitimacy and broad perspectives and constituencies.
Judges and probation and parole officers have neutral perspectives, expertise, and firsthand experience. Prosecutors are perhaps most closely acquainted with the details of a wide variety of cases. Scholars and public
policy experts apply expertise, detachment, and synoptic perspectives. Juries
bring fresh, democratic perspectives to bear in the context of particular cases
in all their complexity. Some of these actors look at crime ex ante and in the
abstract, as legislatures and (very often) scholars do. Many others—prosecutors, sentencing judges, juries, and parole and clemency boards—look ex
post at flesh-and-blood defendants and victims. Many of these actors are
repeat players and professionals. Some, like juries, are deliberately not. Their
rotation in office, akin to term limits, ensures freshness and diffuses the
benefits of public service.181 Like a rope, criminal procedure is stronger if it
weaves together these overlapping perspectives.
These overlapping powers epitomize the checks and balances at the
heart of the Court’s constitutional framework. Ideally, different institutions
should continue to engage in interbranch dialogue. As Justice Kennedy put it
in his Blakely dissent, it is a “fundamental principle under our constitutional
Richard S. Frase, Panel Remarks, Is Guided Discretion Sufficient? Overview of State Sentencing
Guidelines, 44 St. Louis U. L.J. 425, 425–26 (2000) (noting that state sentencing guidelines
have been more successful than the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines).
177.

Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 327 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).

178. See Cunningham v. California, 549 U.S. 270, 295–97 (2007) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting).
179. See Stephanos Bibas, Blakely’s Federal Aftermath, 16 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 333, 341
(2004); Bibas, supra note 115, at 470–74; Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding and Sentence
Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 Yale L.J. 1097, 1158–73 (2001) [hereinafter
Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding].
180. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 327 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); see Bibas, Judicial Fact-Finding,
supra note 179, at 1150–70.
181.
(1991).

Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1189
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system that different branches of government ‘converse with each other.’ ”182
That conversation should occur not only horizontally at the national level
but also vertically between the federal and state levels so that states may
“serve as laboratories for innovation and experiment[ation].”183 Sentencing
guidelines exemplify interbranch collaboration, which “is basic constitutional theory in action.”184
Apprendi, we should say, was not a complete failure. By ultimately invalidating mandatory guidelines, the Court not only returned more discretion
to federal district judges but also began to prompt more give-and-take
among sentencing judges, appellate courts, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission. Booker’s application of a reasonableness standard for review of
sentences in light of the purposes of sentencing freed district courts to better
fine-tune punishments.185 Courts can now persuade the U.S. Sentencing
Commission to revise unsound guidelines through reasoned departures that
illuminate their deficiencies. The Commission, in turn, can respond and can
likewise persuade courts to follow thoughtful and thorough guidelines. At
least as between the Commission and the courts, then, Apprendi made possible the “continuous evolution” through interbranch dialogue that the Sentencing Reform Act had contemplated.186
Ironically, it did so only by implicitly abandoning the rigid adherence to
the individual constitutional right to jury fact-finding that prompted Apprendi in the first place. As Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Rita explained, any
common law system of sentencing that would hold some fact-based sentencing determinations made by district judges reasonable and others unreasonable seems to convert those facts into elements of crimes that, under
Apprendi, must be found by a jury.187 But the post-Booker remedial scheme,
unlike Apprendi and Blakely, rested on practical considerations about how
best to allocate sentencing discretion.188 By allowing district court judges to
(reasonably) depart from guidelines based both on case-specific facts and

182. Blakely, 542 U.S. at 326 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 408 (1989)).
183. Id. at 327 (citing New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
184. Id.
185.

United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 261, 264 (2005).

186. Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350 (2007); see also Amy Baron-Evans & Kate
Stith, Booker Rules, 160 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1631, 1667–81 (2012) (explaining how Booker and its
progeny have fostered interbranch dialogue on federal sentencing policy, “permitting the
courts to communicate with the Commission (and with each other) in a transparent and
effective manner”).
187. Rita, 551 U.S. at 369–73 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
188. See id. at 347–51 (majority opinion); Booker, 543 U.S. at 258–65. Justice Breyer,
who dissented in Apprendi, authored the Court’s remedial opinion in Booker as well as its
opinion in Rita.
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policy disagreements, cases like Rita,189 Kimbrough,190 and Pepper191 fragmented sentencing power in ways consistent with Apprendi’s overarching
mission, if not its formalistic approach.
Miller and Graham likewise have a mixed record in how they confronted
allocations of sentencing discretion. Both decisions shifted power from
front-end to back-end sentencers to determine whether juveniles must
spend the remainder of their lives in prison. The real fault line between the
two cases is how far that shift should go. Miller left prosecutors, trial judges,
and juries more discretion to make the final call, even as it put a thumb on
the scale in favor of including parole boards in all but the most unusual
cases. Graham, by contrast, required parole boards’ involvement in all life
sentences for juveniles who have not killed. That prompted Chief Justice
Roberts to object that the Court had slighted the ability of sentencing judges
to exercise their own individualized moral judgment.192 (Of course, sentencing judges could still exercise their judgment to ensure that juveniles would
not spend their lives in prison. They just could not do the reverse.) But
neither Chief Justice Roberts nor the other justices engaged much with the
realities of how parole boards and sentencing judges actually exercise their
sentencing discretion and how competent each group is to do so.
Even so, in trying to strike a rough balance between ex ante and ex post
sentencing determinations to ensure individualized, morally appropriate
judgments for juveniles, the cases were steps in the right direction. Dissenting in Miller, Justice Alito complained that the majority had cherry-picked
unusually sympathetic cases in which to invalidate mandatory juvenile
LWOP.193 But we need a system that can deal with such cases, sifting them
rather than mechanically applying blanket rules. Thus, Chief Justice Roberts,
concurring in the judgment in Graham, observed that reviewing courts may
temper “the extraordinarily severe punishment” of mandatory LWOP for an
attempted armed robbery by “consider[ing] the particular defendant and
particular crime at issue.”194
Some general guidance analogous to that articulated in Rita with respect
to the division of sentencing power between district and appellate judges
could have been helpful here.195 Incrementalism, however, also has its benefits. It allows states to experiment with new approaches to allocating sentencing discretion without freezing any one approach in place. Pennsylvania,
189. Rita, 551 U.S. at 353–54.
190. Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 111 (2007).
191. Pepper v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 1229, 1247–50 (2011).
192. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2041–42 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., concurring
in the judgment).
193. Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2489 (2012) (Alito, J., dissenting).
194. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2036 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in the judgment).
195. See Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 350–51 (2007) (allowing appellate courts to
presume that within-Guidelines sentences are reasonable in light of the sentencing judge’s role
in exercising discretion, “subject[ing] the defendant’s sentence to . . . thorough adversarial
testing,” weighing whether the case falls beyond the heartland of typical cases, and setting
forth reasons for the sentence imposed).
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North Carolina, and other states are already doing just that, with Graham
and Miller spurring new juvenile sentencing reforms aimed at better individualization.196 These reforms will give courts and policymakers opportunities
to examine more closely questions of procedural and institutional design.
3. The Interaction of Democratic and Judicial Perspectives
Here is where lessons from Woodson/Lockett/Eddings and the Court’s
capital punishment jurisprudence may be especially useful, for they help to
illuminate the limitations of the Court’s approach. On some level, the Woodson/Lockett/Eddings line is most compatible with the basic values of checks
and balances, individualization, and morally appropriate punishment embodied in the Apprendi and Graham lines. These cases (along with a number
of the Court’s other capital punishment decisions) let legislatures specify
capital-murder crimes and let prosecutors seek the death penalty, but the
cases preserve plenty of space for judges and juries to tailor the penalties to
the defendants and crimes that deserve them most. At the same time, like
the rest of the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence, the cases were largely
reactive in how they tried to give effect to those values, and they did so in an
ad hoc manner.197 The Court’s solutions, in other words, did not easily effectuate the constitutional design principles that underlie them. And the judicial posture and pull of stare decisis made it more difficult for the Court—
and sometimes other actors—to experiment, discard failures, and collaboratively improve sentencing over time.
The most basic lesson from that experience is that judges cannot solve
these complex problems of institutional design on their own. The Court has
been right to acknowledge, even if sometimes implicitly, the connection between questions of structural and procedural design and substantive justice
in sentencing. But the Court’s unilateral rights-based solutions have often
been too rigid, too constrained by the limits of the judicial role, and too
removed from other perspectives.198 The Court would do better to articulate
the broader constitutional values at stake, start a conversation, and revisit

196. See, e.g., S.B. 850, 195th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Pa. 2012) (requiring a sentencing court to make findings on the record regarding seven specified factors—including the
impact of an offense on victims and the community, evidence of culpability, and age-related
characteristics such as maturity, mental capacity, criminal sophistication, and potential for
rehabilitation—before imposing LWOP on a minor convicted of murder); S.B. 635, 2011 Gen.
Assemb., 2012 Reg. Sess. (N.C. 2012) (requiring a sentencing court to hold a special hearing
and to make findings on the record concerning the presence or absence of any mitigating
circumstances submitted by a defendant—including age, immaturity, inability to appreciate
the consequences of one’s conduct, and peer pressure exerted by family or friends—before
imposing LWOP on a minor convicted of murder).
197. See Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 401, 426–29.
198. See, e.g., id. at 401 (arguing that the Court’s capital punishment jurisprudence has
amounted to “nothing more than a modest, ad hoc series of limitations” in response to particular state practices).
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the issue periodically to piggyback on other actors’ insights and reforms.199
A better-functioning system would leave room for a sort of democratic experimentalism in sentencing design.200 In particular, courts could prompt
other faithful actors to build more specifically and practically on the Court’s
constitutional vision and its suggestions for further reform.
Another lesson is that courts and policymakers should not squelch discretion simply because it seems lawless. At least some discretion is ineradicable.201 If we squeeze it out of judges and juries, at least some discretion will
remain in the hands of prosecutors, but it will become unchecked and thus
potentially more arbitrary. We must focus instead on helping each actor to
exercise its discretion most effectively.
Finally, a more direct engagement with the design questions at stake
puts a different spin on how to achieve equality in criminal sentencing. Too
often, equality has led actors to overemphasize ex ante rules that are supposed to treat like cases alike. That tendency helps to explain mandatory
minimum sentences and three-strikes laws, which superficially equalize
sentences but are applied quite inconsistently.202 As Rachel Barkow perceptively observes, this administrative ideal of formal equality is hostile to
mercy and discretion and thus seeks to limit the roles of juries and judges. In
practice, however, it has driven discretion underground, leaving prosecutors
a free hand in selecting among charges.203
A more complete understanding of equality is less formal and more
elastic, emphasizing both treating like cases alike and treating unlike cases
unalike. Formal rules that treat all superficially similar cases alike (such as
three-strikes laws and mandatory minima) threaten substantive equality,

199. While incrementalism in constitutional adjudication can sometimes roughly approximate that approach, other judicial systems embrace it more directly. The European Court
of Human Rights’ “margin of appreciation” doctrine is one example. See generally Steven
Greer, The Margin of Appreciation: Interpretation and Discretion Under the European Convention on Human Rights (2000), available at http://www.echr.coe.int/library/
DIGDOC/DG2/HRFILES/DG2-EN-HRFILES-17(2000).pdf (describing the doctrine).
200. See Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic Experimentalism, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 267, 292–323 (1998) (advocating the decentralization of power to
promote experimentation by leaving lower-level governmental institutions free to set goals and
choose means, subject to national oversight and pooling of information).
201. As Kyron Huigens explains, “The existence of discretion, somewhere in the system,
to make a context-sensitive evaluation of the offender’s conduct and character is intrinsic to
criminal law because context-specific, retrospective assessments of the offender and his wrongdoing are intrinsic to just punishment.” Huigens, supra note 90, at 818.
202. See, e.g., David Bjerk, Making the Crime Fit the Penalty: The Role of Prosecutorial
Discretion Under Mandatory Minimum Sentencing, 48 J.L. & Econ. 591, 603–09 (2005); Erik
G. Luna, Foreword: Three Strikes in a Nutshell, 20 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 1, 24–25 (1998); Samara Marion, Justice by Geography? A Study of San Diego County’s Three Strikes Sentencing
Practices from July–December 1996, 11 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 29, 37 (1999).
203. See Rachel E. Barkow, Essay, The Ascent of the Administrative State and the Demise
of Mercy, 121 Harv. L. Rev. 1332, 1334–35, 1340–44, 1351–53, 1360–63 (2008).
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which must reflect other morally relevant criteria. Equality is not about ensuring numerical symmetry but reaching individualized, morally appropriate sentencing judgments while filtering out tangential and irrelevant factors
(such as prosecutorial charging tactics). Ex ante rules may serve as valuable
benchmarks and mental anchors to ground the sentencing inquiry, but they
do not obviate case-specific tailoring.204 That complex balance calls for cooperation among many sentencing institutions, not just legislative or appellate pronouncements from on high. Individualization, far from threatening
equality, promotes substantive equality (rightly understood).
III. Sentencing Reform Beyond Individual Rights
Over the last decade, the Court has groped its way toward importing
structural and procedural design considerations into the context of noncapital sentencing. But, in squeezing those considerations into the rights-based
confines of the Sixth and Eighth Amendments, it has done so haphazardly.
In this Part, we suggest other, nonconstitutional ways to serve the principles
embedded in the Court’s turn in Graham and Apprendi. None of this is to
imply that the Court’s move in those cases was wrong or misguided. Constitutional rulings are often necessary to spur correction of structural imbalances that threaten constitutional values; those rulings can come almost
exclusively through individual rights, interpreted by courts case by case, in
light of precedent. But once courts have articulated the principles at issue,
other actors can and should step in to translate those principles to practical
reforms in ways that courts often cannot. After four decades, the political
branches are finally beginning to do just that in capital sentencing, engaging
constitutional concerns about reliability and arbitrariness by weighing measures such as death penalty moratoria, innocence commissions, access to
DNA testing, and racial-impact studies.205
A similar dynamic should inform noncapital sentencing much earlier.
Nonjudicial actors should experiment with procedural and structural reforms to elaborate the constitutional norms that underlie the Graham and
204. For explanations of the psychological phenomenon known as anchoring, see, for
example, Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 119–28 (2011), and Amos Tversky
& Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 Science 1124,
1128–30 (1974).
205. See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 23, at 92, 125–26, 163–64, 220 n.19 (discussing racialimpact studies and related moratoria); James S. Liebman & Lawrence C. Marshall, Less Is
Better: Justice Stevens and the Narrowed Death Penalty, 74 Fordham L. Rev. 1607, 1654–55,
1657 (2006) (discussing moratoria); Robert J. Norris et al., “Than That One Innocent Suffer”:
Evaluating State Safeguards Against Wrongful Convictions, 74 Alb. L. Rev. 1301, 1354–57 &
tbl.5 (2010/2011) (discussing innocence commissions); The Innocence Project, Criminal
Justice Reform Commissions: Case Studies, http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/
Criminal_Justice_Reform_Commissions_Case_Studies.php (last visited June 3, 2013) (discussing innocence commissions); The Innocence Project, Fix the System: Access to DNA
Testing, http://www.innocenceproject.org/fix/DNA-Testing-Access.php (last visited June 3,
2013) (discussing access to DNA testing); see sources cited supra note 55 (discussing death
penalty moratoria in Illinois and Oregon).
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Apprendi lines. There are a variety of ways to do so, and we sketch some
general proposals here. Laymen and other actors could have greater roles in
sentencing, on juries or otherwise. Baseline rules and presumptions could
foster the more considered use of mandatory minima, sentencing guidelines,
and plea bargaining. Procedures could allow second looks to reassess initial
charging and punishment decisions and could structure back-end safety
valves like parole and clemency to function more effectively. And prosecutors could be required to ration their pursuit of the toughest charges and
punishments or to submit to a special approval process before seeking them.
Our suggestions are meant to be illustrative, not exhaustive.
Some readers may favor approaching such reforms through interpreting
the Due Process Clauses, which are more flexible and hospitable than the
Sixth and Eighth Amendments and are thus better suited to effectuating the
structural design considerations we have discussed above. But much, if not
most, of these reforms would better come through legislation, procedural
rules, and changes to prosecutorial practices. While courts may take the initiative to prompt reforms, they should try to draw upon the strengths of
other institutions. That means, for example, leaving sentencing commissions
plenty of latitude, and prodding prosecutors to address problems without
telling them precisely how to do so. That approach of instigating rather than
dictating allows other actors to draw upon their own expertise, to experiment, and to fine-tune their reforms based on feedback and experience.206
The idea is that reforms that judges may not be able to implement through
rights-based doctrines could nevertheless do much to further the constitutional values at stake.
A. Reinvigorating Lay and Judicial Involvement at Sentencing
In theory, judges impose criminal sentences. In a majority of states, statutes give them wide discretion within broad statutory ranges.207 In the minority of jurisdictions with sentencing guidelines, sentencing commissions
offer guidance but still leave judges significant room to adjust or depart
from those guidelines.208 But in reality, as discussed, prosecutors dominate
sentencing.209 That concentration of power offends the sentencing design
principles at the core of this Article. It bypasses checks and balances and
collapses the variety of perspectives that should inform morally appropriate,
206. For discussions of how courts and sentencing commissions can do so and have
done so, with a particular focus on the experience in New Jersey, see Ronald F. Wright,
Prosecutorial Guidelines and the New Terrain in New Jersey, 109 Penn. St. L. Rev. 1087
1090–103 (2005), and Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs of
Prosecutorial Self-Regulation, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1010, 1027–42 (2005) [hereinafter Wright,
Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs].
207. See Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Criminal Procedures 1364,
1373–74 (4th ed. 2011).
208. See Richard S. Frase, State Sentencing Guidelines: Diversity, Consensus, and Unresolved Policy Issues, 105 Colum. L. Rev. 1190, 1196 tbl.1 (2005).
209. See supra Section I.A.
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individualized sentencing determinations into the decision of one person,
the prosecutor.210
On the broadest level, solutions should involve more robust mechanisms for checking and balancing prosecutorial power. One way to create
such mechanisms is to reinvigorate the voices of laymen and other actors at
sentencing.211 Woodson rested in part on the observation that juries were
nuanced in authorizing the death penalty, undercutting the constitutional
case for requiring it across the board.212 The Apprendi line of cases addressed
some of these problems by requiring that juries, not judges, find facts that
raise maximum sentences. Even so, Apprendi anachronistically stylized the
battle as judges versus juries, when the most powerful actor who needs
checking is the prosecutor.213 Apprendi also rested on the fiction that juries
authorize punishments in some meaningful sense. Yet plea bargaining cuts
them out of the process. Even where it does not, juries in most states have
only indirect roles in noncapital sentencing, as they never learn the punishments that they are supposedly authorizing.214
There are better, more targeted ways to incorporate Apprendi’s structural insight. Laws could specify the universe of most serious cases in which
juries would have at least some sentencing authority—say, where the statutory or guideline-based sentence sought exceeds ten (or twenty) years’ imprisonment. In those cases, sentencing juries would be informed of the
possible punishments and asked which punishments they would authorize.215 That would check one tail of the plea-bargaining bell curve: cases in
which the prosecution threatens extremely long sentences, possibly to gain
plea-bargaining leverage, and then feels that it must carry out the threat so
that future defendants do not call its bluff. The jury would apply its sentencing judgment to offer case-specific input. That would counterbalance
prosecutorial incentives, requiring prosecutors to justify their trial penalties
to neutral arbiters not invested in backing plea-bargaining leverage.
Lay involvement could extend beyond jury service. Community representatives could offer input into the process of formulating and revising
charging, plea-bargaining, and sentencing guidelines.216 And laymen could
play roles at the very back end of sentencing. For example, parole boards

210. See Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 9, at 1024–28, 1047–49.
211. See Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 9 at 107; Bierschbach & Bibas, supra
note 27, at 37–56.
212. See Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 294 n.29 (1976) (plurality opinion).
213. See Bibas, supra note 115, at 466, 474.
214. See supra notes 113–114 and accompanying text.
215. See Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 370–72 (explaining the benefits of providing the
jury more information about possible sentences); Ronald F. Wright, Rules for Sentencing Revolutions, 108 Yale L.J. 1355, 1377 (1999) (reviewing Stith & Cabranes, supra note 140).
216. See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27, at 40–47.
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should not be limited to a governor’s cronies but should include both experts and lay members. We could also consider having parole juries, even if
their role were only advisory.217
Reinvigorating the judiciary’s structural check is critical as well. Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for instance, requires that pleas
have adequate factual bases. Sentencing judges could more rigorously enforce Rule 11 by conducting more in-depth plea hearings and rejecting unduly lenient or harsh sentences in light of the underlying facts. Appellate
courts could encourage sentencing judges to become more involved by requiring them to justify their sentences in greater detail. Because plea-bargained sentences are almost never appealed, policymakers might consider
allowing sua sponte appellate review, appeals by probation officers, or even
automatic appeals for certain limited categories of sentences, much as states
provide for automatic appeals in capital cases.218 Many of the reform suggestions proposed in the following Sections could likewise enhance judicial involvement. They could prompt prosecutors to explain their decisions to
judges and other actors and to structure sentencing in ways that encourage
judges to truly judge.
B. Relaxing Mandatory Sentences
Legislatures authorize criminal sentences ex ante, often enacting stiff
mandatory sentences to credibly threaten tough punishment and thus deter
crime. Prosecutors, however, remain free to bargain away supposedly
mandatory charges, turning these strictures into bargaining chips.219 Thus,
the law ties judges’ hands but not prosecutors’, making prosecutors’ bargaining threats all the more credible and effective. In part for that reason,
the Miller Court refused to defer to legislatures’ and prosecutors’ decisions
to seek LWOP for juveniles.220
Mandatory minimum sentences are effective at greasing the wheels of
plea bargaining. But they badly undermine the structural considerations that
lie behind Graham and Apprendi. These laws are crude sledgehammers
adopted at the wholesale level precisely to exclude later retail input. They
217. See e.g., Ball, supra note 30, at 407–10; Douglas A. Berman, A Truly (and Peculiarly) American “Revolution in Punishment Theory”, 42 Ariz. St. L.J. 1113, 1120 (2011) (discussing how parole juries could bring laypersons’ sense of justice to parole release decisions).
218. See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27, at 8, 57; see also Ala. Code § 12-22-150
(LexisNexis 2012); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 31.2(b); Cal. Penal Code § 1239 (West 2004); Ga. Code
Ann. § 17-10-35 (2008); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 177.055 (2011); Federal Habeas Manual
§ 9B:27 (2012) (reviewing automatic appeal statutes for capital cases).
219. See Bibas, supra note 23, at 45–48; Stuntz, supra note 19, at 535–38, 550–52;
William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining and Criminal Law’s Disappearing Shadow, 117 Harv. L.
Rev. 2548, 2549 (2004). Indeed, prosecutors blocked the initial version of a California law,
which would have impeded charge bargaining for many serious crimes, until it was watered
down to allow prosecutors to evade it through early charge bargaining. See Candace McCoy,
Politics and Plea Bargaining: Victims’ Rights in California 29–31 (1993).
220.

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2474–75 (2012).
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bypass checks and balances, denying judges and juries any say in the appropriate punishment. And their effect is to deter, incapacitate, and exert pleabargaining leverage in practice, not to tailor punishments to moral blameworthiness. While in theory prosecutors could drop charges ex post to proportion punishments to crimes, in practice they must carry out their threats
against recalcitrant defendants to keep future threats from ringing hollow.221
While prosecutors need and deserve some leverage, concentrating most
adjudicative power in their hands alone is dangerous. At a minimum,
mandatory minimum sentences should include expanded safety-valve provisions for nonviolent offenders, especially those without criminal records, so
that sentencing judges can sentence below the minimum in specified cases.
That would give the judge, and perhaps a jury, more say on whether an
unarmed street-corner drug dealer is dangerous enough to require imprisonment for a decade or more. Judges might also inform juries of the proposed mandatory punishment, so that their guilty verdicts authorize that
punishment in some meaningful sense.222 That awareness would temper
mandatory sentences grossly disproportional to a particular defendant’s
blameworthiness.
More radically, mandatory minimum sentences might no longer be
binding. Minimum sentences would be presumptive rather than mandatory
(at least where a mandatory sentence exceeded some threshold such as five
or ten years). They would set strong mental anchors and benchmarks, allowing sentencing judges (or juries, where they exist) to anchor and adjust
from those starting points.223 Sentencers would thus have the opportunity to
gauge the entirety of the defendant’s blameworthiness and dangerousness,
the wrongfulness of the crime, the severity of the harm, and the like.
That kind of particularized assessment is a key end of both the Graham
and Apprendi lines of cases.224 Each side could paint the entire picture, and
sentencers could explain and justify their deviations from the presumptive
sentences. Trial and appellate judges could review sentences, deferring more
to sentences closer to the presumptive figure, with a presumption in favor of
sentences that track the statutory minimum.225 That approach would mirror
current review of within- and beyond-range federal guideline sentences and
221. See Louis Michael Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of
Continuity and Change in Criminal Procedure, 80 Colum. L. Rev. 436, 479 (1980); Mark
Tushnet & Jennifer Jaff, Critical Legal Studies and Criminal Procedure, 35 Cath. U. L. Rev. 361,
365 (1986) (“If a system of bargaining is to survive, the prosecutor must be allowed to carry
through on the threats made in the bargaining process.”).
222. Cf. Barkow, Recharging the Jury, supra note 9, at 110–16.
223. Id. at 119; Steven L. Chanenson, The Next Era of Sentencing Reform, 54 Emory L.J.
377, 444 (2005); Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 370–73.
224. See, e.g., Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2467–69; Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466,
483–84 (2000); see also Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 303–05 (1976) (plurality
opinion) (requiring individualized consideration at capital sentencing).
225. We have argued at greater length for a similar approach to sentencing elsewhere.
See Bierschbach & Bibas, supra note 27, at 38–46, 48 (advocating a nonmandatory guideline
system that would extend to prosecutors’ charging decisions).
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would inject more individualized judgment and checks and balances into the
process.226
C. Sentencing Guidelines and Presumptions
Many of the suggestions above for mandatory minimum sentences
could apply to sentencing guidelines as well. They should serve as advisory
mental anchors. Sentencing judges or juries could deviate from them, with a
sliding scale of appellate review keyed to how closely trial judges and juries
had followed their recommendations, but appropriate reasoning could justify even significant departures.227
A series of visual aids could structure sentencers’ decisions on how to
apply the guidelines. Charts and graphs could display frequency distributions for unarmed thefts of various dollar amounts, for example, with vignettes describing the median, top third, and bottom third guidepost
cases.228 Sentencing judges or juries could anchor on those and adjust from
there. (Note that while anchoring and adjustment is often criticized as a
mental heuristic, here it would have the salutary effect of promoting consistency because the anchor would be deliberately selected to be
representative.)
Furthermore, courts could take into account the extent to which guidelines reflect morally appropriate sentencing judgment and the input of a
variety of actors. One of the arguments for guideline sentencing is that sentencing commissions are not only broadly representative but also bring
criminal justice expertise into the conversation.229 But at the federal level,
Congress has increasingly intervened in the process, mandating guideline
enhancements without further study or reflection.230 For example, Congress
226. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (allowing reviewing courts to take
into account the extent of any departure from the federal guideline range and to require more
significant justifications for major departures than for minor ones); Rita v. United States, 551
U.S. 338, 350–53 (2007) (authorizing appellate courts to apply a presumption of reasonableness to within-guideline sentences).
227. See Wright, Sentencing Commissions as Provocateurs, supra note 206, at 1030–31,
1042 (describing a New Jersey reform that employs such a “departure structure”). The Federal
Sentencing Guidelines’ departure provision was originally intended to function much in this
way. See, e.g., Baron-Evans & Stith, supra note 186, at 1638–39, 1641.
228. See Wright, supra note 215, at 1377 (“A standard report could inform jurors of the
average sentence imposed for persons convicted of the same crimes as the defendant, and for
persons who have a similar criminal record. The report . . . could even describe the distribution of sentences . . . .”); see also Iontcheva, supra note 88, at 368–69 (suggesting that
“[s]tatistics could be compiled at the county, district, or state level” and provided to jurors
during sentencing deliberations); Adriaan Lanni, The Future of Community Justice, 40 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 359, 404 (2005) (stating that the court could “inform[ ] sentencing jurors of
the historical range of sentences imposed for similar crimes and defendants”).
229. E.g., Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 19, at 717–18; Wright, Sentencing
Commissions as Provocateurs, supra note 206, at 1036–42.
230. See William K. Sessions III, At the Crossroads of the Three Branches: The U.S. Sentencing Commission’s Attempts to Achieve Sentencing Reform in the Midst of Inter-Branch Power
Struggles, 26 J.L. & Pol. 305, 317–21, 334–36 (2011).
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mandated crack-cocaine guidelines that treated one ounce of crack cocaine
as severely as one hundred ounces of powder cocaine.231 Those guidelines are
now advisory. Because the crack-cocaine guidelines did not reflect the Commission’s special expertise, the Court has held, they do not merit the same
level of deference by sentencers.232 The same approach could apply to other
guidelines, with the caveat that reviewing courts should consider whether
the guidelines blended expertise with reasoned moral evaluation by a range
of actors.
Even beyond guidelines, courts could employ more presumptions to
structure sentencing and force a dialogue among various sentencing actors.
That approach would follow the Court’s own suggestion in Miller that
LWOP should be disfavored for juvenile killers but could be justified in particular circumstances.233 The presumption places a thumb on the scale and
helps to elicit individualized reasons grounded primarily in moral judgment
as to why a particular defendant might deserve the harsher sentence. Miller’s
presumption shifts sentencing’s focus from mechanical general deterrence ex
ante by the legislature, subject to prosecutorial manipulation, to overt moral
decisionmaking case by case, ex post, by accountable, reviewable sentencers.
Courts or legislatures could adopt other presumptions to temper the
most extreme sentences. For example, criminological research shows that
wrongdoers are most likely to commit future crimes from their teens into
only their twenties and perhaps thirties.234 (Those who commit fraud and
other white-collar criminals may be the exception.) Thus, most inmates do
not need incapacitation into their forties and beyond.235 Applying that insight, long sentences that extend into criminals’ forties or beyond could be
disfavored and not automatic, requiring individualized retributive or deterrence-based justifications rather than generic fears of the sort underlying
three-strikes laws.236
231. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c) (2005) (amended 2012).
232.

Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85, 109–10 (2007).

233.

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).

234. Linda S. Beres & Thomas D. Griffith, Do Three Strikes Laws Make Sense? Habitual
Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapacitation, 87 Geo. L.J. 103, 135 (1998) (“The peak ages for
criminal activity are the late teens and early twenties.”); James Q. Wilson, Crime and Public
Policy, in Crime and Public Policy 619, 624 (James Q. Wilson & Joan Petersilia eds., 2d ed.
2011) (“Typical offenders commit most of their crimes when they are in their early twenties,
and very few after they reach their forties.”); see also U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Felony Sentences in State Courts, 2006—Statistical Tables 16 tbl.3.1
(rev. 2010) (showing that 73 percent of all felony convicts were under the age of forty at the
time of sentencing), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf.
235. Michael Tonry, Purposes and Functions of Sentencing, 34 Crime & Just. 1, 31
(2006) (“There may be . . . justifications for confining [thirty- or forty-year-old] offenders for
extended periods; but from an incapacitative perspective, such sentences are expensive, inefficient, and largely ineffective.”); see also Beres & Griffith, supra note 234, at 136–37.
236. A few courts have already taken tentative steps down this path in the context of
reviewing denials of discretionary parole. See, e.g., Robles v. Dennison, 745 F. Supp. 2d 244,
287, 296 (W.D.N.Y. 2010) (noting “an extremely strong claim” that a parole board’s consistent
refusal to grant release based solely on the circumstances of the original crime is arbitrary and
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Similar presumptions could accommodate Miller’s and Graham’s concerns to leaven retributive impulses by respecting defendants’ possibility of
reform and redemption. A substantial fraction, if not a majority, of crime is
fueled in one way or another by alcohol, drugs, mental illness, or some combination of these factors.237 Defendants whose crimes involved such circumstances might presumptively be eligible for parole after successful treatment
and a certain number of years of remaining clean, sober, or on needed medication.238 The law could require sentencers to make individualized judgments as to when particular crimes and criminals are serious and
blameworthy enough to defeat that presumption.239
D. Reassessing Charges at Sentencing
One of the thorniest separation-of-powers difficulties in criminal justice
is that prosecutors set the terms of the debate by deciding which charges to
file or not file. They do this on their own without meaningful outside input
or process.240 That power to set charges was not a problem when grand juries, petit juries, and judges meaningfully scrutinized criminal charges and
when sentencing judges had substantial sentencing flexibility to offset tough
irrational), aff’d, 449 F. App’x 51 (2d Cir. 2011); In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 539 (Cal. 2008)
(holding that the “immutable circumstance” of the original offense will not “inevitably support[ ] the ultimate decision that the inmate remains a threat to public safety” in the face of
overwhelming contrary evidence (emphasis omitted)); People v. Mendez, 114 Cal. Rptr. 3d
870, 881 (Ct. App. 2010) (agreeing with a juvenile defendant’s contention that his “sentence of
84 years to life constitutes cruel and unusual punishment because it amounts to a de facto
sentence of life without parole”).
237. See Doris J. James & Lauren E. Glaze, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Mental Health Problems of Prison and Jail Inmates 1 (2006), available
at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/mhppji.pdf (“At midyear 2005 more than half of all
prison and jail inmates had a mental health problem . . . .”); Christopher J. Mumola &
Jennifer C. Karberg, U.S. Dep’t of Justice Bureau of Justice Statistics, Drug Use and
Dependence, State and Federal Prisoners, 2004, at 2 (rev. 2007), available at http://www
.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/dudsfp04.pdf (stating that 33 percent of state prisoners and 26 percent of federal prisoners reported being under the influence while committing a crime).
238. E.g., N.Y. Correct. Law § 805 (McKinney Supp. 2013) (stating that a prisoner
“serving a sentence with a minimum term of not more than eight years” who successfully
completes a treatment program “shall be granted parole release at the expiration of his minimum term”); cf. 28 C.F.R. § 2.60(b) (2012) (making certain prisoners eligible for advancement
of their presumptive release dates after “successful completion of a residential substance abuse
program of at least 500 hours”); Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug
Treatment Court Movement, 76 Wash. U. L.Q. 1205, 1209–15 (1998) (describing the advent of
drug treatment courts as an alternative to imprisonment conditioned on the offender’s successful adherence to and completion of a drug treatment program).
239. See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012) (“Although we do not foreclose a sentencer’s ability to [impose LWOP] in homicide cases, we require it to take into
account how children are different, and how these differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime in prison.”).
240. Barkow, supra note 203, at 1351–52; Barkow, Separation of Powers, supra note 9, at
995; Standen, supra note 17, at 1501.
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or lenient charging decisions. But today, even in the federal and state systems that still require grand jury indictments for serious crimes, grand juries
are rubber stamps.241 And, as discussed, mandatory sentences, sentencing
guidelines, and truth-in-sentencing laws restrict judges’ ability to counterbalance prosecutors.
Radical changes may be necessary. First, many crimes are initially
charged as lesser felonies but then routinely bargained down to misdemeanors: think of grand versus petit larceny, or simple burglary versus breaking
and entering where no weapons or injuries are involved.242 The difference
between the two can be significant. A felony conviction not only carries
more stigma but can disqualify a defendant from a range of future jobs and
benefits.243 Where prosecutors follow an across-the-board charging or bargaining policy, they can—at least in theory—be held accountable for that
policy ex ante through public criticism or at the ballot box, although that
might not work well in practice.244 But when prosecutors bargain selectively
or haphazardly, even that check is lost.
Just as sentencers could receive frequency distributions to illuminate
median sentences along a curve, they could also receive distributions of
charging and bargaining patterns for felony charges that are either usually or
rarely bargained away (say, more than 80 percent or less than 20 percent of
the time). The sentencers would then review a case that fell in the minority,
evaluating the prosecutor’s proffered justification for treating that case more
harshly or leniently than other like cases. Prosecutors could still use charge
reductions as bargaining leverage, but they would have to explain and justify
why the leverage was appropriate. Even requiring a simple paragraph in
writing or a two-minute oral explanation would provide some protection. A
prosecutor might, for instance, explain that a defendant had an unusually
long criminal record, had refused to make restitution, and had offered no
remorse or apology. The prosecutor would find it harder to threaten shocking sentencing disparities, reining in outliers. This approach would not only
241. See Andrew D. Leipold, Why Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused,
80 Cornell L. Rev. 260, 263–64 (1995). As former Chief Judge Sol Wachtler famously
quipped, a grand jury would “indict a ham sandwich.” Marcia Kramer & Frank Lombardi,
New Top State Judge: Abolish Grand Juries & Let Us Decide, Daily News, Jan. 31, 1985, at 3.
242. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal Defendant’s Right to Trial:
Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 931, 952 (1983); Josh Bowers,
Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1117, 1152–53 (2008); see also Bordenkircher v.
Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978) (upholding plea bargains whereby a defendant’s “plea may
have been induced by promise of a recommendation of a lenient sentence or a reduction of
charges, and thus by fear of the possibility of a greater penalty upon conviction after a trial”).
243. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice Office of the Pardon Attorney, Federal Statutes Imposing Collateral Consequences upon Conviction, available at http://www.
justice.gov/pardon/collateral_consequences.pdf.
244. For a discussion of how poorly prosecutorial elections work in practice to illuminate the issues and check prosecutorial policy decisions, see Ronald F. Wright, How Prosecutor
Elections Fail Us, 6 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 581, 583 (2009). For our argument for publishing
prosecutors’ policies and making them accountable and reviewable ex ante, see Bierschbach &
Bibas, supra note 27, at 40–47.
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promote sentencing equality but would also use a retail-level check to promote individualized moral evaluation of cases that deserve tougher
treatment.245
The same approach could apply to charges that are often brought as
criminal charges but later dismissed in favor of civil charges, restitution, or
other less severe measures. Prosecutors sometimes decide to pursue substantial white-collar criminal penalties against some fraudsters, but they often
allow others to enter nonprosecution agreements and make restitution.246
Some differences among these cases justify different treatment: for instance,
mens rea varies and can be hard to prove, and some defendants are more
proactive in trying to prevent, expose, and fix misdeeds. But observers suspect that prosecutors’ self-interests in claiming high-profile scalps on Wall
Street play a role, too.247
Prosecutors could have to justify their white-collar criminal charges,
whether at trial, plea bargaining, or sentencing, which would make them
accountable for explaining inconsistencies and variations in their practices.
That would bring into the open haphazard practices—at least in cases with
substantial discrepancies that produce markedly different results—which
could otherwise cloak illegitimate charging variations. Yet prosecutors’ burdens would be easy to meet so long as prosecutors pursued consistent policies, such as refusing to convert criminal charges involving theft or
embezzlement of more than $100,000 into civil claims.
Charging review should also extend to charges that carry significant collateral consequences but have substitutes that do not. Sexual assault charges,
for example, carry significant stigma and require registration as a sex offender, while nonsexual assaults do not.248 Domestic violence convictions
may preclude future gun possession, while other kinds of batteries may
not.249 Certain nonviolent drug convictions make noncitizens automatically

245. Cf. Ronald Wright & Marc Miller, The Screening/Bargaining Tradeoff, 55 Stan. L.
Rev. 29, 48–58, 106 (2002) (describing how a more reasoned and structured prosecutorial
screening process could lead to more accurate and “honest” charging and bargaining
decisions).
246. See Michael Edmund O’Neill, Understanding Federal Prosecutorial Declinations: An
Empirical Analysis of Predictive Factors, 41 Am. Crim. L. Rev. 1439, 1453 (2004).
247. See Deniz Anginer et al., Should Size Matter When Regulating Firms? Implications
from Backdating of Executive Options, 15 N.Y.U. J. Legis. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 22–23 (2012); Adam
M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests: How Excessive Prosecutorial
Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 Nw. U. L. Rev. 261, 299 n.173 (2011) (“[W]hite
collar prosecutions bring significant favorable media attention.”).
248. See, e.g., Catherine L. Carpenter, The Constitutionality of Strict Liability in Sex Offender Registration Laws, 86 B.U. L. Rev. 295, 324–38, 360–61 (2006); Roxanne Lieb et al.,
Sexual Predators and Social Policy, 23 Crime & Just. 43 (1998); Corey Rayburn Yung, The
Emerging Criminal War on Sex Offenders, 45 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 435 (2010).
249. See Lisa D. May, The Backfiring of the Domestic Violence Firearms Ban, 14 Colum.
J. Gender & L. 1, 3–8 (2005); Allen Rostron, Protecting Gun Rights and Improving Gun Control
After District of Columbia v. Heller, 13 Lewis & Clark L. Rev. 383, 405–06 (2009).
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deportable, while others do not.250 When prosecutors choose one of these
charges rather than the other, they are also choosing the collateral consequences that follow. Yet our legal system largely pretends that these consequences are no part of the criminal penalty because they are labeled civil,
and jurors have no idea that their verdicts are authorizing them.251
Charging review could thus apply to cases in which a collateral consequence is not bargained away even though it is frequently bargained away in
other similar cases. Sentencing judges or juries would consider whether deportation, sex-offender residency restrictions, and the like should apply to
this particular defendant. That would check prosecutors’ unilateral charging
power, bringing individualized moral judgment to bear.
E. Plea Bargaining
Fixing sentencing also requires tackling earlier decisions upstream, such
as charging and plea bargaining, that greatly shape sentencing later on. In
plea bargaining, neither judges nor (nonexistent) juries provide meaningful
checks or oversight of unilateral prosecutorial power. One idea we and
others have floated elsewhere is to use advisory plea juries in at least the
most serious cases as a check on the procedural and substantive justice of
particular deals.252
Another important reform would be to ban or severely restrict the use
of particularly coercive penalties as plea-bargaining chips. The threat of the
death penalty, LWOP, or perhaps very long mandatory sentences for
juveniles can frighten even innocent defendants into pleading guilty to
lighter charges.253 Conversely, carrying out those threats for the small percentage of defendants who resist them makes an enormous amount of punishment depend not on a defendant’s individual moral desert but on his
own or his lawyer’s reckless tactical decision. While carrying out such threats
may be institutionally rational for a prosecutor seeking to clear his own
250. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B) (2006) (providing for the deportability of any alien
convicted of any law “relating to a controlled substance” other than a single offense involving
possession for one’s own use of thirty grams or less of marijuana); see also Darryl K. Brown,
Why Padilla Doesn’t Matter (Much), 58 UCLA L. Rev. 1393, 1399–402 (2011) (discussing the
deportation issues raised by Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010)).
251. See, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin & Richard W. Holmes, Jr., Effective Assistance of Counsel
and the Consequences of Guilty Pleas, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 697, 703–09 (2002); Jenny Roberts,
Ignorance Is Effectively Bliss: Collateral Consequences, Silence, and Misinformation in the GuiltyPlea Process, 95 Iowa L. Rev. 119, 131–34 (2009). That artificial divorce of collateral consequences from criminal cases is slowly changing. See, e.g., Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473,
1486–87 (2010) (holding that the Sixth Amendment requires criminal defense lawyers to advise clients accurately about the likelihood of deportation before they plead guilty).
252. Appleman, supra note 81, at 750–68; Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach,
Essay, Integrating Remorse and Apology into Criminal Procedure, 114 Yale L.J. 85, 141, 144
(2004); see also Jason Mazzone, The Waiver Paradox, 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 801, 872–78 (2003)
(proposing plea panels focused on the fairness and voluntariness of plea waivers).
253. See Arthur Rossett & Donald R. Cressey, Justice by Consent: Plea Bargains in the American Courthouse 155 (1976); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea
Bargaining as Contract, 101 Yale L.J. 1909, 1948 (1992).

December 2013]

Constitutionally Tailoring Punishment

447

docket, it is an amoral and coercive way to allocate the most severe penalties
in our system.
Our model might be a scaled-down version of how the U.S. Department
of Justice already handles death penalty cases. Federal prosecutors may not
simply charge every death-eligible homicide as a capital crime and then bargain the death penalty away. Instead, before bargaining, federal prosecutors
must first give notice to opposing counsel that a defendant is charged with a
potentially capital crime, whether or not they intend to seek the death penalty.254 They must then submit a death penalty evaluation form and memorandum to an internal prosecutorial committee at Main Justice in
Washington, D.C.; defense lawyers also prepare their own submission as to
why death is inappropriate in a particular case.255 The panel compares the
case to similar ones and decides whether to authorize a capital case or not.256
The Department of Justice’s standards instruct prosecutors not to seek or
threaten the death penalty for plea-bargaining leverage, although ultimate
approval of any plea bargain remains with the local U.S. Attorney and does
not require approval from Main Justice.257 This federal standard is quite different from that used by many district attorneys, some of whom routinely
charge all or many death-eligible crimes as capital murder only to bargain
that charge away.258
Our proposal would probably be bureaucratically simpler, at least for
noncapital cases. Under our approach, line prosecutors would need to ask a
committee of supervisory prosecutors for approval to charge crimes carrying
very high sentences, such as death, life with or without parole, or very long
mandatory minimum sentences.259 They would document both the ability to
prove the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and the culpability that makes
the particular defendant deserve that punishment. The panel would compare the case to similar ones in which it had recently authorized charges.
Once the panel approved the charge, the prosecutor would have to take it to
254. Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the
Department of Justice’s Role, 26 Fordham Urb. L.J. 347, 408–10 (1999).
255. Id. at 408–11.
256. See id. at 412.
257. Id. at 417–19.
258. See, e.g., Tina Rosenberg, The Deadliest D.A., N.Y. Times, July 16, 1995, § 6 (Magazine), at 20 (reporting that Lynne Abraham, Philadelphia’s district attorney, “seeks death
virtually as often as the law will allow,” but also that her office “does it to get a plea to life and
a death-qualified jury” (quoting Robert E. Colville, district attorney, Allegheny County) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Mike Tolson, Part 1: A Deadly Distinction—Harris County Is
a Pipeline to Death Row, Hous. Chron., Feb. 4, 2001, at A1 (“If the death penalty substantively
fits a given crime and I have enough stuff so that a jury will give it, tell me why I shouldn’t
prosecute it.” (quoting John B. Holmes, former district attorney, Harris County) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
259. Rachel Barkow advocates a similar review system (using either individual prosecutors or a panel) on separation-of-functions grounds for all charging, bargaining, and cooperation decisions. See Barkow, Institutional Design, supra note 9, at 901, 915–17.
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trial absent a significant change of circumstances and approval by that
panel.260
Removing the tactical incentive to charge high and bargain low would
refocus these most serious charging decisions on what a particular defendant
deserves. It would also promote consistency and equality by introducing an
important check on a single prosecutor’s idiosyncratic views and self-interest in disposing of his own cases. And it would reduce the enormous trial
penalties imposed on defendants for simply refusing to play ball.
F.

Rationing Charges

Our most radical, and thus most tentative, suggestion is that the number of certain especially aggressive kinds of charges and sentences be capped,
forcing prosecutors to ration these charges and sentences for the worst cases.
Woodson sought to prevent legislatures and prosecutors from securing the
death penalty across the board, forcing them to differentiate the worst of the
worst. Miller did the same for juvenile killers facing LWOP. Although these
penalties are no longer automatic, prosecutors may still threaten them in too
many cases based on tactical advantage rather than blameworthiness or
dangerousness.
Prosecutors are in a good position to sort the worst offenders for the
worst charges. But they are tempted to threaten everyone with tough charges
to exert maximum plea-bargaining leverage.261 If a prosecutor’s office actually seeks the death penalty at trial in only 10% of its murder cases, perhaps
it should not be permitted to charge more than 15% of its murder cases as
death-eligible.262 As Miller stated that LWOP should be an “uncommon”
sentence for juvenile killers,263 perhaps prosecutors should be able to seek
that sentence in only 20% or 25% of such cases. This approach would parallel that of Minnesota’s sentencing commission. Based on the limited capacity of Minnesota’s prisons, sentencing commissioners had to rank which

260. This charging unit would thus resemble a more limited version of not only Main
Justice’s procedures for authorizing capital charges but also the centralized charging unit in the
New Orleans District Attorney’s Office. For an excellent explanation and evaluation of how
that office’s charging unit worked under former District Attorney Harry Connick, Sr., see
Wright & Miller, supra note 245, at 61–64.
261. See Albert W. Alschuler, The Prosecutor’s Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 50, 85–105 (1968) (documenting various ways prosecutors overcharge to induce guilty
pleas); see also Bowers, supra note 17, at 1707–08 (noting prosecutors’ incentives to resolve
most cases quickly).
262. Cf. Steiker & Steiker, supra note 34, at 416 (“If the sum total of death-eligible
offenders reasonably corresponded to the number of persons that were actually sentenced to
death, the state would fulfill the narrowing requirement.”).
263.

Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 2469 (2012).
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inmates most needed longer sentences.264 To imprison more first-time violent offenders, the sentencing commissioners chose in exchange to imprison
fewer repeat property offenders.265
Another possible approach is to develop grids to sort criteria for pursuing certain charges. Empirical evidence, for example, suggests that prosecutors seek and juries return death sentences fairly consistently in certain
circumstances, such as murder for hire, murder of a police officer, or when
three or more aggravating factors are present.266 On the other hand, juries
are unlikely to return death sentences in cases with only a single aggravating
factor, such as a killing in the course of robbing a store.267 These patterns
should develop into feedback loops to structure prosecutorial charging policies. Policies would limit capital charges to fact patterns in which juries return death sentences with some regularity so that prosecutors do not use
charges simply as bargaining leverage. The same should be true of substantial mandatory sentences and sentence enhancements. Indeed, a few states
have already implemented this idea. Both New Jersey and Florida have developed charging guidelines for recidivism and other enhancements to ensure
that prosecutors apply them consistently.268
264. Richard S. Frase, The Minnesota Sentencing Guidelines, in Penal Populism, Sentencing Councils and Sentencing Policy 83, 91 (Arie Freiberg & Karen Gelb eds., 2008)
(describing how prison capacity acted as a restraint on the Minnesota Sentencing Commission
and how “any member, constituency or interest group that proposed greater severity for one
group of offenders was asked to identify other offenders who could receive correspondingly
reduced severity”); Michael Tonry, Intermediate Sanctions in Sentencing Reform, 2 U. Chi. L.
Sch. Roundtable 391, 392 (1995) (explaining that “Minnesota . . . established a ‘resource
constraint’ ” policy in which “the projected effects of sentencing standards [must] be compatible with available and planned prison resources”).
265. Michael Tonry, Sentencing Guidelines and Their Effects, in The Sentencing Commission and Its Guidelines 16, 18–19 (1987); see also Dale G. Parent, Structuring
Criminal Sentences: The Evolution of Minnesota’s Sentencing Guidelines 28 (Daniel
J. Freed ed., 1988); cf. Francis T. Cullen et al., Public Opinion About Punishment and Corrections, 27 Crime & Just. 1, 35–36 (2000) (discussing the perceived trade-off of imprisonment—preventing crime but hardening criminals—as applied to violent and nonviolent
offenders); Tonry, supra note 264, at 399 (discussing the imprisonment trade-off in the context
of diversion programs for minor crimes).
266. David C. Baldus et al., Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the
Death Penalty: A Legal and Empirical Analysis of the Nebraska Experience (1973–1999), 81 Neb.
L. Rev. 486, 548–53, 549 fig.2, 552 fig.3, 553 tbl.4 (2002); David C. Baldus et al., Comparative
Review of Death Sentences: An Empirical Study of the Georgia Experience, 74 J. Crim. L. &
Criminology 661, 698–700, 699 tbl.1, 700 tbl.2 (1983).
267. See Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Race, Religion, and Death Sentencing in
Illinois, 1988–1997, 81 Or. L. Rev. 39, 81–91 (2002) (providing statistics showing how often
juries return death sentences given the presence or absence of certain aggravating factors);
Chelsea Creo Sharon, Note, The “Most Deserving” of Death: The Narrowing Requirement and
the Proliferation of Aggravating Factors in Capital Sentencing Statutes, 46 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
Rev. 223, 248 (2011) (“It is unlikely that any one aggravating factor could capture the kind of
extreme culpability capable of provoking near-universal death sentencing among jurors.”).
268. For discussions of how New Jersey’s and Florida’s charging policies evolved and
what they accomplish, see sources cited supra note 206, and Marc L. Miller & Ronald F.
Wright, The Black Box, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 125, 192–93 (2008). See also Bierschbach & Bibas,
supra note 27, at 38–40.
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The moral of the story is that, using feedback from judges, juries, and
voters, prosecutors can do more to more finely tailor their charges to track
retail-level judgments of blameworthiness reached by other actors. This approach would serve as a proactive check on and guide for the future exercise
of prosecutorial discretion.
G. Making Back-End Sentencing a True Check
Finally, discretionary parole and other back-end sentencing mechanisms
must be reformed to tailor justice more effectively. That means, among
other things, changing both the decisionmaking structures and perhaps the
composition of parole boards so that they have the incentives and perspectives to act as true checks on front-end sentencers. Many of our suggestions
applicable to front-end sentencing could apply here as well. Certain categories of crimes or those committed under specified circumstances could carry
presumptions of release, rebuttable only by individualized justifications as to
why a particular inmate should not receive the benefit of the presumption.
These justifications should go beyond the pro forma, blanket references to
the wrongfulness of the original crime or an offender’s continuing dangerousness that are now common.269 To push back against parole boards’ incentives to avoid risk at all cost, parole boards might be required to explicitly
consider the net costs of imprisonment versus release when making decisions.270 More radically, they could have quotas, pegged to crime categories,
recidivism rates, and criminological data, requiring them to recommend a
specified number of prisoner releases each year. These guideposts could be
clearly laid out as part of transparent guidelines.271
Other actors could participate as well. Parole juries could sit for a series
of parole release hearings, much as grand juries sit for a specified period of
time. This participation would bring a fresh community perspective to the
fundamentally normative question about which offenders were worth the
risk.272 Prosecutors and (as in some European jurisdictions) even judges
could likewise participate, rotating through on panels and helping to identify promising candidates for release, perhaps in conjunction with a quota

269. See W. David Ball, Heinous, Atrocious, and Cruel: Apprendi, Indeterminate
Sentences, and the Meaning of Punishment, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 893, 903, 916, 970 (2009); Ball,
supra note 30, at 399–400.
270.

Ball, supra note 30, at 399–400.

271. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 51, at 437.
272. See Ball, supra note 30, at 408 (discussing the irreducibly normative nature of
parole release decisions and the jury’s role in making normative release judgments). To further
push back against parole boards’ lopsided incentives, parole juries could be encouraged “to
think in terms of whether it is more important to keep this person in prison for another
period of years or whether we should use that money to hire another teacher, fix another road,
hire another police officer, or lower taxes.” Id. at 409.
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system.273 That would create a further check on the board and would generate feedback loops that ultimately could inform prosecutorial and judicial
charging, bargaining, and sentencing decisions in the first instance. More
generally, judges reviewing parole board decisions could do a better job of
ensuring individualized decisionmaking by requiring boards to identify the
key offender-specific considerations in their decisions, discuss how those
considerations influenced the outcome, and respond to significant arguments and views from other actors in the process.274 A judge confronted
with a given case might also insist on increasingly stronger justifications for
a refusal to release as time goes by, particularly where the offender has committed a nonviolent crime or has an exemplary record, or where the victims,
prosecutor, or community members either support or do not object to
release.275
Similarly, beyond parole, judges or independent commissions might be
given more active and structured roles in the executive clemency process.
Judges could revive the time-honored tradition of recommending clemency
directly to the executive in opinions or letters.276 Commissions containing
representatives from the defense bar, prosecutors, judges, victims, community members, and even legislators could play a similar role.277 These
changes could reduce the political risk involved, reinvigorating pardons and
commutations as safety valves for individualized justice.278
Conclusion
The recent history of constitutional criminal procedure is one of applying rights-based solutions to what are sometimes institutional or structural
problems. That is neither surprising nor troubling per se. Individual rights,
after all, are “how courts translate structural values into adjudicatory claims
273. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 51, at 437–38. See generally Release from Prison:
European Policy and Practice (Nicola Padfield et al. eds., 2010) (reviewing European approaches to parole release).
274.

Bierschbach, supra note 25, at 1785–87.

275. See, e.g., In re Lawrence, 190 P.3d 535, 539 (Cal. 2008) (holding that where “evidence of the inmate’s rehabilitation and suitability for parole . . . is overwhelming,” the original circumstances of the offense and conviction will not “inevitably support[ ]” denying parole
(emphasis omitted)).
276. See George Lardner, Jr. & Margaret Colgate Love, Mandatory Sentences and Presidential Mercy: The Role of Judges in Pardon Cases, 1790–1850, 16 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 212, 213
(2004) (describing methods whereby judges would petition the president for clemency);
Joanna M. Huang, Note, Correcting Mandatory Injustice: Judicial Recommendation of Executive
Clemency, 60 Duke L.J. 131, 156 & n.165 (2010) (reviewing modern cases in which judges
recommended clemency in their written opinions and requested that their opinions be sent to
the Office of the Pardon Attorney).
277. See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, The Politics of Forgiveness: Reconceptualizing Clemency,
21 Fed. Sent’g Rep. 153, 155–56 (2009). As with parole boards, such commissions could be
encouraged or required explicitly to take costs and benefits into account in their recommendations. See id. at 156–67.
278. See, e.g., id. at 155–57; Huang, supra note 276, at 152–57.

452

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 112:397

capable of resolution by jurists as opposed to philosophers or policymakers.”279 They cabin the judicial role, preventing courts from “fashioning doctrine out of whole cloth without regard to the constitutional text” and
pushing judges to focus on concrete, “judicially manageable remedies.”280
Graham, Apprendi, and their progeny would have been difficult to litigate
and judicially resolve as abstract cases about sentencing design, divorced
from the Sixth and Eighth Amendments and the precedents interpreting
them.
We should not, however, ignore the underlying design principles.
Rights, for all their value, tend to become reified. They can impair thinking
about new reforms and obscure deeper connections among strands of individual doctrine.281 Through Graham and Apprendi, the Court is awkwardly
using rights-based doctrines to change the structures of criminal justice to
ensure deliberation about individualized, morally appropriate sentences.
The Court’s procedural approach to promoting substantive justice befits our
liberal democracy, in which the competing values and considerations are
diverse and pluralistic. To complete this project, other actors must pick up
the Court’s constitutional baton and strive to right sentencing’s structural
imbalances.
The Court can constitutionally inspire other actors, prompting them to
experiment and perhaps elaborate constitutional norms. That collaboration
could lead to an interactive, evolutionary learning process in which unsuccessful experiments wither while successful ones eventually solidify into best
practices and even a consensus. The Court should continue to reveal and
refine the architecture of criminal justice. But it cannot constitutionally tailor punishment on its own.

279. Guy-Uriel Charles, Judging the Law of Politics, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 1099, 1128
(2005) (reviewing Richard H. Hasen, The Supreme Court and Election Law (2003)); see
also Amar, supra note 181, at 1132 (arguing that “[a] close look at the Bill [of Rights] reveals
structural ideas tightly interconnected with language of rights” in order to empower popular
majoritarian sovereignty).
280. Charles, supra note 279, at 1128.
281. See, e.g., Tracey L. Meares & Dan M. Kahan, The Wages of Antiquated Procedural
Thinking: A Critique of Chicago v. Morales, 1998 U. Chi. Legal F. 197 (arguing that the
Warren Court’s top-down, judicially enforced individual rights approach to criminal procedure has outlived its usefulness and is impeding reform in an era of greater minority enfranchisement and new approaches to community policing).

